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CALCULATING COMPENSATION SUMS FOR PRIVATE LAW 
WRONGS: UNDERLYING IMPRECISIONS, NECESSARY 
QUESTIONS, AND TOWARD A PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNT OF 
DAMAGES FOR LOST YEARS OF LIFE
Michael Pressman∗
ABSTRACT
The ubiquitous corrective-justice goals of “making a party whole” or “returning 
a party to the position she was in” are typically understood in monetary terms, 
and in this context it is fairly clear what these terms mean. If, as this Article 
argues, these corrective-justice goals should instead be understood in terms of
something that has intrinsic value, such as happiness, various imprecisions come 
to the fore. This Article identifies and explores these imprecisions and, in so doing, 
articulates a novel framework that can be used for understanding and 
systematizing our approach to private law remedies. This is the Article’s first task.
Next, the Article focuses on the imprecision that the law must grapple with 
whose implications are most salient: how to aggregate happiness across years of a 
life. This imprecision becomes significant in the context of torts that shorten a 
person’s life. The Article explores the appropriate measure of damages (under a 
corrective-justice theory) in cases in which a victim has her expected future 
shortened by a tort (e.g., medical malpractice or exposure to carcinogens), but in 
which she has not yet died. The fact that the victim is still alive makes it possible to 
compensate the victim herself directly for the value of life-years. Should she be 
compensated? The question, already critical in a number of cases, will 
substantially increase in prevalence with developments in science and technology 
in the coming years. This Article argues, contra current law in most states, that 
the law should take these types of cases seriously and that victims should be 
compensated if their loss of life-years constitutes a loss of happiness. The contrary 
position is in great tension with the commonsense intuition that losing life-years is 
one of the most (if not the most) serious harms that one can incur. But is our 
commonsense intuition correct?
The Article proposes a three-step framework that can be used for addressing 
these questions of loss and getting to the appropriate measure of monetary 
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compensation: (1) Determine which “happiness aggregation function” to espouse, 
(2) determine how much happiness (if any), according to one’s happiness 
aggregation function of choice, a plaintiff lost as a result of the harm; and (3) 
determine how much monetary compensation will bring about a transfer of 
happiness to the plaintiff that will equal the amount that she lost (according to 
one’s happiness aggregation function of choice).
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INTRODUCTION
Arguably1 the entire purpose of private law remedies is to make 
an aggrieved party whole, or, said differently, to make it the case 
1. I say “arguably” because while this formulation reflects a backward-looking account 
of private law remedies (espoused, in the context of tort law, by corrective justice theorists), 
there also is another account: a forward-looking account (espoused by law-and-economics 
600 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:3
that a person who is aggrieved can (as best as possible) have the 
harm he incurred be undone. Or, said differently still, the purpose 
of private law remedies arguably is to bring a person back to 
“where he was,” to “the position that he was in,” or to “the level that 
he was at” before incurring the harm that he incurred. Different 
remedies in different areas of private law have different doctrines, 
but they all employ this notion of bringing a person back to the 
level that he was at.
But what does it mean to bring a person back to where he was or 
the level that he was at? Although it is a notion that sits at the very 
core of private law remedies—and, indeed, is ubiquitous across all 
areas of the law—the concept of “the level that one is (or was) at”
turns out to be under-described, imprecise, and vague in various 
ways—even though these imprecisions have seemingly gone unno-
ticed.
This Article identifies these imprecisions, and it explores the var-
ious ways and contexts in which the law confronts them and is, as a 
result, forced to grapple with how best to articulate more precise 
formulations. The main context in which the law confronts these 
imprecisions is in “different-numbers cases,” a category of cases 
that this Article will introduce, and the most important example of 
which involves the determinations that courts must make regard-
ing how to compensate plaintiffs in tort law for having their lives 
shortened by a defendant’s tortious behavior. More specifically, the 
determinations at issue here are about how to compensate for a 
particular component of a claim arising out of the tortious short-
ening of life: how to compensate for the harm of failing to experi-
ence the years of life that were lost (the victim’s “hedonic loss”2). 
After showing how the imprecisions come to the fore in this con-
text, this Article explores the law’s treatment of these cases, which 
reveals that the law generally fails to compensate plaintiffs for the 
lost life-years themselves.
The legal system could confront cases of plaintiffs seeking a 
remedy for the harm of lost life-years in two contexts: First, a case 
might be brought after a victim has died. In such a case, although a 
remedy for the lost life-years arguably might be warranted in order 
to bring about optimal incentives for future tortfeasors,3 it could be 
theorists). I explain in Part I.B, infra, the various reasons for why it is defensible and, indeed 
optimal, for this Article to proceed through a backward-looking lens.
2. For usage of the term “hedonic loss,” see, e.g., Cass Sunstein & Eric Posner, Dollars 
and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 544–45 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1119–20 (1985); Sunstein & Posner, supra note 2, at 556; Michael 
Pressman, Hedonic-Loss Damages that Optimally Deter: An Alternative to “Value of a Statistical Life”
that Focuses on Both Decedent and Tortfeasor (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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argued that plaintiffs should not recover for this harm because this 
harm was to a victim who is no longer alive and therefore cannot 
be compensated.4 This Article, however, primarily explores a sec-
ond context in which plaintiffs might seek a remedy for the harm 
of lost life-years: cases in which a victim has her expected future 
shortened by a tort (e.g., medical malpractice or exposure to car-
cinogens), but in which she has not yet died. In a case of this type, 
the fact that the victim is still alive makes it possible to compensate 
the victim herself directly for the value of life-years. Thus, even if 
compensation for lost life-years is not warranted in cases where the 
victim is dead, it might still be warranted in cases where the victim 
is still alive.
The fact that the law generally fails to compensate plaintiffs for 
lost life-years even when the victim is alive and able, herself, to be 
compensated is in great tension with the commonsense intuition 
that having one’s life shortened is one of the most (if not the most)
serious harms that one can incur. If this commonsense intuition is 
correct, the rule against compensation for a person whose life is 
shortened seemingly is an egregious gap in the law that needs to 
be filled.
This Article explores the appropriate measure of damages for 
situations where a victim has her expected future shortened by a 
tort but in which she has not yet died, and it argues, contra current 
law in most states, that the law should takes these types of cases se-
riously and that victims should be compensated if their loss of life-
years constitutes a loss of happiness.5 Although this Article does 
not provide a conclusive answer to the questions of whether, and, if 
so, how much, a person should be compensated for having her life
shortened, the Article’s analysis of the imprecisions in the concept 
of “the level that one is at” enables us to recognize the existence of 
and identify important unanswered questions—and, indeed, un-
asked questions—in this area of the law, and provides us with the 
theoretical framework and tools to answer them. These questions 
are not only theoretical, but also practical—with our answers hav-
ing important tangible impacts on the lives of many. Further, not 
only is it already crucial that we articulate plausible answers now, 
but the Article argues that developments in science and technology 
in the coming years will substantially increase the frequency with 
4. Some might argue, however, that, even if the victim cannot be compensated for the 
lost life-years, it would be appropriate for her estate to be compensated for this harm.
5. Although this Article focuses on situations in which the victim is still alive at the 
time of the suit, the analysis in this Article will also apply to cases where the victim is no 
longer alive if one is of the view that plaintiffs should indeed recover for a victim’s “hedonic 
loss” even in cases where the victim is dead at the time of the suit.
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which the law confronts these questions, thus making the current 
inquiry all-the-more urgent.
* * * *
The Article proceeds as follows:
Part I provides two brief preliminary discussions. First, it pro-
vides descriptions and examples of “different-numbers problems”
so that the reader can more vividly grasp the nuts and bolts of 
these problems, the issues they raise, and why they are so difficult 
to satisfactorily resolve. Second, Part I (1) provides descriptions 
and clarifications regarding forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts of tort law (and of private law more generally)—which 
correspond, respectively, to the positions of the law-and-economics 
theorist and of the corrective-justice theorist; (2) explains the in-
teractions between the two accounts; and (3) explains the assump-
tions that this Article will be making regarding these issues.
With these preliminary discussions aside, Part II then begins the 
Article’s inquiry by describing the concept of “the level that one is 
(or was) at” and showing that this notion sits at the core of private 
law remedies (as well as being employed across all other areas of 
the law). It then explains how the notion is imprecise in various 
ways. The first step in identifying the imprecisions is to recognize 
that the law’s typical focus on a person’s financial position is mere-
ly a proxy for one’s position in terms of happiness (or, perhaps, 
some other feature of a person’s welfare that similarly might be 
thought to be intrinsically valuable).6 Part II shows that, once the 
shift is made to understanding “the level that one is (or was) at” in 
terms of happiness, three key imprecisions come to the fore: (1) 
how to quantify the happiness level of a moment of experience, 
(2) the temporal question of which portion of one’s life—be it 
one’s whole life, a temporal chunk thereof (e.g., one’s future), or 
single moments—should be the relevant portions of a person’s ex-
istence used for determining the position that one was in, is now 
in, or will be returned to, and (3) if the relevant portion of one’s
life is a period extended over time that includes more than one 
conscious moment, what function to use (be it sum-aggregative, 
6. The questions that I address in this Article will be just as relevant and important to 
answer even for those who think that things other than happiness have intrinsic value and 
that not everything boils down to happiness. Although, going forward, I will explore the is-
sues here through a happiness lens, readers could instead substitute in for happiness anoth-
er feature of experience that they believe has intrinsic value, and my discussions will have 
similar force in that other context. Theorists operating with other accounts of value will con-
front the same questions that I will be raising here. Thus, this Article’s discussions are equal-
ly important for those who do not think that all value boils down to happiness.
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averaging, or something else) to determine the value of the whole, 
given the value of its parts.
With respect to each of the identified imprecisions, this Article 
assesses (1) whether the law must be more precise or if it can get 
by with the current imprecision, (2) if it must be more precise, 
which situations require this greater precision, and (3) if the law 
requires that the formulations be more precise, what the law’s
more precise formulations should be.
Part II concludes, with respect to the second imprecision, that it 
cannot be sidestepped, but it offers a solution to what the question 
of what the law’s more precise formulation should be. Part III then 
addresses the question of whether the law must be more precise 
with respect to the first imprecision, and it argues that it need not 
be, and thus that the law is able to sidestep this question.
Ultimately, the bulk of the Article is devoted to exploring the 
third imprecision (about which aggregation function to use to de-
termine the value of the temporal whole, once we know—and tak-
ing as given—the values of the individual temporal parts), because, 
unlike the first imprecision (but like the second), it cannot be 
sidestepped, and, unlike the second imprecision, it is extremely
difficult to resolve. The third imprecision is addressed in Part IV.
As Part IV shows, the law does have to address the third impreci-
sion if the law confronts “different-numbers problems”—in short, 
cases where two wholes are being compared, the goodness of both 
of which is a function of the goodness of their respective parts, but 
where the two wholes are made up of a different number of parts. 
Further, Part IV argues that the law does in fact confront different-
numbers problems, and that it does so when a person incurs a 
harm that shortens his expected future (e.g., among other things, 
cases of (1) medical malpractice, (2) torts of exposure to danger-
ous substances, such as asbestos or smoking, (3) torts of accidents, 
such as car accidents or construction accidents, and (4) intentional 
torts, including but not limited to intentional killings).7,8 Thus, 
these are cases where the law will need to answer the question of 
which aggregation mechanism to espouse.
As will be shown in Part IV, the third imprecision (unlike the 
second imprecision) is extremely difficult to satisfactorily resolve. It 
7. Or, more generally, when the length of his future is affected either by having it 
made longer or shorter. This Article will focus, however, on cases where a person incurs a 
harm that shortens his expected future.
8. As already stated, situations where one’s life is shortened by a tort could come in 
two stripes: those where the victim is dead at the time of suit and those where the victim is 
still alive. This Article focuses primarily on the latter—though the analysis applies to the 
former as well if one thinks that plaintiffs should recover for a victim’s harm of lost life-years 
even if the victim is already dead.
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is extremely difficult to provide a plausible account of what our ag-
gregation function should be. Said differently, it is extremely diffi-
cult to articulate a plausible account of how to value lost years of 
life, and this, in large part, is due to the fact that it is extremely dif-
ficult to articulate a plausible account of how to trade off quantity 
of life against quality of life.
Next, Part V proceeds to explore the law’s treatment of these 
cases. It turns out that the law almost as a rule does not allow a per-
son to be compensated in situations where a person is harmed by 
having his life shortened—irrespective of whether the victim is 
dead or alive at the time of the suit. Prima facie, this suggests that 
the law is saying that a person is not harmed by having his life 
shortened. Part V explores various practical reasons why we might 
not allow a person to be compensated for having his life shortened 
even if we do think that he is harmed by having his life shortened 
(including, among other things, the fact that victims are often 
dead at the time of the suit and thus often unable to be compen-
sated themselves), but Part V concludes that these reasons are not 
sufficient for denying compensation across the board to people 
who have their lives shortened. Part V thus suggests that courts are 
indeed saying that a person who has his life shortened is not 
harmed. This, however, is in great tension with commonsense intu-
itions that having one’s life shortened is one of the most serious 
harms that one can incur. If our commonsense intuitions are cor-
rect and we are not allowing compensation for what is in fact a se-
rious harm (if not the most serious harm) that a person can incur, 
then the law’s rule against compensation for a person whose life is 
shortened is an egregious gap in the law that needs to be filled.
Thus, to determine if commonsense intuitions are correct, and 
thus whether there in fact is an egregious gap in the law, the next 
steps are to explore the questions of (1) whether a person can be 
harmed by having his life shortened, (2) if so, how much of a harm 
this is, and the related, and, indeed, corresponding, questions of 
(3) whether a person should be compensated in tort for having his 
life shortened, and (4) if so, how much a person should be com-
pensated for having his life shortened. I explore these topics in 
depth elsewhere,9 but provide a brief summary of them here—
sketching out the two key analyses involved in answering these 
questions: (1) determining which aggregation mechanism is most 
plausible, and (2) converting the answer to the happiness ques-
tions into a measure of compensation for the aggrieved person.
9. See, e.g., Michael Pressman, Aggregating Happiness: A Framework for Exploring Compen-
sation for Lost Years of Life, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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Lastly, in Part VI, the Article considers various extensions and 
further implications of the foregoing discussions. Perhaps the most 
important of these is as follows: while the number of cases caught 
within the net of the discussions of the Article is already significant, 
the Article provides reasons to think that, with time and further 
development of technology, the number of cases that confront the 
issues that this Article grapples with will grow substantially and 
precipitously. Thus, though these questions are already of great 
importance, their importance will continue to grow. In light of 
this, it is all-the-more crucial that we address these questions, and 
that we do so as soon as possible.
After addressing this extension as well as the others in Part VI, 
the Article concludes.
The contributions that this Article makes are both theoretical 
and practical. The theoretical: The discussions and conclusions of 
this Article provide analysis and insight in areas where there have 
been gaps in legal theory. Noticing that these gaps exist and show-
ing them to the reader is the key first step that this Article carries 
out. Second, the Article attempts to provide answers to many of the 
questions, and to at least lay the foundations for answers to others.
The theoretical contributions also result in practical contribu-
tions. Most important are the practical implications associated with 
potential compensation for a person who has his life shortened. 
Since the current state of the law—which does not provide for 
compensation to a person for his having his life shortened—is in 
great tension with commonsense intuition, it may well be in need 
of significant changes. These changes would affect private law 
remedies and affect the lives of very many people.
Lastly, the goals of this Article can also be described at a higher 
level of generality: to bring about a legal system that better furthers 
both fairness and efficiency. My hope is that the considerations in 
this Article and the changes to the law that they set in motion can 
make progress with respect to both fairness and efficiency.
I. TWO PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS
Part I provides two brief preliminary discussions intended to 
clarify what follows. First, it provides descriptions and examples of 
different-numbers problems so that the reader can more vividly 
grasp the nuts and bolts of different-numbers problems, the issues 
they raise, and why they are so difficult to satisfactorily resolve. 
Second, Part I (1) provides descriptions and clarifications regard-
ing forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law 
(and of private law more generally)—which correspond, respec-
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tively, to the positions of the law-and-economics theorist and of the 
corrective-justice theorist; (2) explains the interactions between 
the two accounts; and (3) explains the assumptions that this Article 
will be making regarding these issues.
A. Numerical Examples of Different-Numbers Problems
Before proceeding further, the following provides examples that 
introduce and explain different-numbers problems.
Suppose that the happiness of a life is a function of the happi-
ness of each of the moments of conscious experience that the life 
is composed of. Further, let’s make the simplifying assumption that 
any particular period of time for any person always contains the 
same number of conscious moments. Now consider two examples, 
each of which compares the lives of two people.
Example 1: Suppose that Person 1 lives for 100 years and that 
each of his conscious moments is of happiness level five. Suppose 
that Person 2 also lives for 100 years but that each of his conscious 
moments is of happiness level seven. Which life is happier? Which 
life would one rather live? Person 2’s life. This is an easy question 
to answer, and this is because it involves a “same-numbers” prob-
lem. The number of components making up the whole in both of 
the states of affairs being compared was the same: 100 years of con-
scious moments.
A “different-numbers” problem, however, is not always easy to 
answer.10 Example 2: Suppose (again) that Person 1 lives for 100 
years and that each of his conscious moments is of happiness level 
five. Suppose that Person 3 lives for 50 years and that each of his 
conscious moments is of happiness level eight. This is a different-
numbers problem, because the comparison is between two wholes 
that are composed of a different number of components. Which 
life is happier, Person 1’s or Person 3’s? Which life would one ra-
ther live? Here, the answer is not obvious. It depends on what ag-
gregation mechanism (i.e., function) one employs for going from 
the values of the parts to the value of the whole.
If one uses what I will call total-utilitarianism-type (TU-type) ag-
gregation, the happiness of a life is the sum of the happiness values 
for each conscious moment. Thus (if we label a year’s worth of 
conscious moments of level x as summing to x units of 
ness11), Person 1’s life will have a happiness value of 500 (i.e., 5 x 
10. See Part IV.B, infra, for a more in-depth discussion of this topic.
11. If we were to be more precise, and if there were, say, one billion conscious mo-
ments in a year, then if each moment were at level five, then there would be five billion 
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100), whereas Person 3’s life will have a happiness value of 400 
(i.e., 8 x 50). If one uses what I will call average-utilitarianism-type 
(AU-type) aggregation, the happiness of a life is the average of the 
happiness values for each conscious moment, and thus Person 1’s
life will have a happiness value of five, whereas Person 3’s life will 
have a happiness value of eight. Thus, our determination of which 
life is happier (or better) will be a function of which aggregation 
mechanism we employ (because TU says Person 1’s life is happier,
but AU says Person 3’s life is happier).
Importantly, it’s not immediately obvious which aggregation 
mechanism is the more plausible one. As this Article will show, alt-
hough TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation both have at-
tractive features, they are both also afflicted by seemingly devastat-
ing counterintuitive implications that appear to render each of 
them (and their various respective temporal sub-versions, to be de-
scribed later) implausible.12 Various accounts that are hybrids of 
TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation also can be offered, 
but they too seem to be afflicted by devastating counterintuitive 
implications.13 Perhaps one could come up with some other more 
plausible option for an aggregation mechanism, but it’s not clear 
what other views there might be that do not fit within one of the 
categories just described. Thus, not only do different-numbers 
problems force us to choose among the various possible aggrega-
tion mechanisms, but it’s extremely tricky to articulate a single ag-
gregation mechanism that can satisfactorily handle all cases.
In same-numbers problems, on the other hand, however, we 
need not choose between AU-type and TU-type aggregation (or 
other, hybrid, theories), because they will always yield the same 
comparative assessments between the states of affairs that are being 
compared.
As we can now see, different-numbers problems are tricky. How-
ever, although different-numbers problems are a problem that phi-
losophers confront, it has not been recognized that they are a 
problem that the law also must confront. As far as I can tell, there 
has not been a single discussion about different-numbers problems 
in the context of the law—not in academic literature, in case law, 
or anywhere else. This is concerning, because there are situations 
happiness units in the year. Or, if one wants to say that there are five units in the year, then 
one could say that what we had called happiness level five was actually happiness level five-
divided-by-one-billion. I’ll opt for the first of these two possibilities here, meaning that the 
number I give to a person’s annual total happiness units is actually in, say, billions. This de-
tail does not affect the analysis here, though, so it suffices to employ the simplified terms.
12. See Part IV.B, infra for a more in-depth discussion of this topic.
13. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 119-41 (1984); Michael Pressman, 
A Defence of Average Utilitarianism, 27 UTILITAS 389 (2015).
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in which the law must confront different-numbers problems, and it 
is of great importance (1) that we become aware of how and when 
the law confronts them and (2) that we come up with a solution 
that ensures the law will resolve such situations satisfactorily. This 
Article carries out the first task, and it attempts to lay the founda-
tions for the second.
B. Backward-looking and Forward-looking Accounts of Tort Law 
(and of Private Law more Generally)
In the Introduction, I wrote that “[a]rguably the entire purpose 
private law remedies is to make an aggrieved party whole, or, said 
differently, to bring a person back to ‘where he was,’ to ‘the posi-
tion that he was in,’ or to ‘the level that he was at’ before incurring 
the harm that he incurred.” This, indeed, is the lens through 
which this Article will proceed, but, before proceeding, it is im-
portant to note a wrinkle and to explain the assumptions under 
which I will be operating.
The underlying rationales for tort law (and private law, more 
generally) ultimately actually fall into two main camps: forward-
looking theories (typically espoused by law-and-economics theo-
rists)14 and backward-looking theories (espoused, in the context of 
tort law at least, by corrective-justice theorists).15 Forward-looking 
theories maintain that the law is and should be determined by 
what brings about optimal incentives for future actors. Backward-
looking theories maintain that the law is and should be deter-
mined by what brings about corrective justice to the harmed par-
ties in any particular case (i.e., what makes these parties whole).
In this Article, I will explore the doctrines in question exclusively 
through the backward-looking lens. Doing so is defensible for 
three reasons.
First, I have argued elsewhere that, contra popular belief, for-
ward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are entire-
ly compatible and coextensive.16 Thus, from my perspective, ex-
ploring the doctrines in question through the backward-looking 
14. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Richard Posner, Wealth 
Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
15. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory, see JULES 
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012);
Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
16. Michael Pressman, The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Accounts 
of Tort Law, 15 UNIV. N.H. L. REV. 45 (2016).
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lens also simultaneously satisfies exploring them through a for-
ward-looking lens.
Second, even if my compatibility hypothesis were false, explor-
ing the doctrines in question through a backward-looking lens is 
important, because even if the backward-looking lens doesn’t con-
stitute the whole picture of what is relevant, the vast majority of 
theorists would think that it constitutes at least (an important) part
of what is relevant to the analysis of whether a private law doctrine 
(e.g., a tort doctrine) is good.
Third, even if my compatibility hypothesis were false and one 
didn’t think that corrective justice was at all important in and of 
itself, I think that the determination of what would make the plain-
tiff whole is often the key first step in determining what the opti-
mal damages would be from a forward-looking perspective (i.e., in 
terms of creating the optimal incentives). While the economist 
would likely consider other factors as well, a key component even 
of the forward-looking analysis is to quantify the externalities im-
posed by the behavior that the defendant engages in, and this sum 
typically is the amount that it would take to make the plaintiff 
whole (i.e., bring him back to the level that he was at before incur-
ring the harm that he incurred).
Additionally, even if each of the three foregoing reasons were not per-
suasive, the backward-looking framework employed by this Article 
would still be an important exploration, albeit one that in that case 
would thus not speak to all readers. There are indeed many who 
do view the purpose of private law remedies exclusively through a 
backward-looking lens, and, for them, exploring the issues through 
a backward-looking lens would constitute the whole picture.
For these reasons, this Article will proceed by discussing the is-
sues exclusively through a backward-looking lens and assume that 
the purpose of private law remedies is to make a harmed person 
whole.
II. THE LAW’S GOAL OF RETURNING A PERSON TO “THE LEVEL THAT 
ONE WAS AT,” AND HOW THIS IS AN IMPRECISE NOTION
A. The Notion of “the Level that One Was at” and Its Ubiquity in the Law
A large number of areas of the law employ the notion of “the 
level that one was at,” or “the position that one was in” to describe 
some aspect (be it financial, happiness-related, or something else) 
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of a person’s situation before the occurrence of an event (such as 
an event that causes the person harm).17,18 This is especially the 
case in private law areas—including contracts, torts, property, and 
unjust enrichment—and, in particular, in private law remedies, but 
it is the case in various (and diverse) other areas of law as well, in-
cluding, to name just a few, tax law,19 constitutional law,20 criminal 
law,21 and family law.22
Within private law, the notion of “the level that one is at” is par-
ticularly ubiquitous. Private law areas govern the interactions 
among private citizens, and the entire purpose of private law rem-
edies is (arguably, and speaking loosely) to make it the case that a 
person who is aggrieved or wronged can have this aggrievance or 
17. In many areas (especially in the private law areas), the notion is employed explicit-
ly, though in other areas it is employed implicitly. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Against Fuller 
and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 101 (2000); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936).
18. As will be discussed below, in Part II.B, these notions seem to generally be under-
stood to refer to either the financial level that one was at and the financial position that was 
in or the happiness level that one was at and the happiness position that one was in. See, e.g.,
Craswell, supra note 17, at 102; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 17, at 54. While there are occa-
sions where it is made clear whether the terms “the level that one was at” and “the position 
that one was in” refer to the position and level in “financial” or “happiness” terms, this is 
rarely the case. Thus, until Part II.B, below, where I address head-on whether the terms are 
meant to refer to “financial” or “happiness” levels and positions, I will simply use the generic 
form of the terms—which is how they typically are used. I mention here what the two main 
options are for giving content to the “position” and “level,” though, because otherwise it 
might be somewhat mysterious what these phrases might be referring to.
19. Virtually all doctrines in tax law are premised on identifying the position a person is 
in and then taxing him accordingly. This is apparent from an income tax’s basic premise of 
taxing a person based on the level of income he receives, but this is also apparent from oth-
er less central doctrines—including, just to name two, rules regarding imputed income and 
deductions for medical expenses. See generally Michael Pressman, “The Ability to Pay” in Tax 
Law: Clarifying the Concept’s Egalitarian and Utilitarian Justifications and the Interactions Between 
the Two, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2018); William Andrews, Personal Deductions in 
an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisit-
ed: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World,
31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
20. Among other examples: in order to determine if a plaintiff is the proper party to 
bring a matter before a federal court, four requirements must be met, one of which is that 
the party must allege and prove that he has been injured. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The inquiry into whether the party has been injured involves, 
among other things, a comparison between the position that he was in before the event in 
question and the position that he was in after the event in question.
21. Among other examples: many sentencing enhancements for white-collar crimes 
involve determinations of how great the losses caused by the defendant were. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019). These involve 
setting as a baseline the position that a victim (be it a person or an entity) was at prior to the 
crime, and then comparing this position to the victim’s position after the crime. See id.
22. For the purposes of determining spousal support after a divorce, the law often 
strives, in various ways, to put a spouse in the position he or she was in before the divorce. As 
one example, California courts base spousal support, in part, on the standard of living estab-
lished during marriage. Cal. Fam. Code § 4330(a). This standard of living is used as a base-
line for the purposes of determining spousal support under the Cal. Fam. Code § 4320(a) 
circumstances.
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wrong undone—at least as best as is possible. In other words, the 
goal of private law remedies is to put the plaintiff back into the po-
sition where he would have been but for the violation of his legal 
right. That this is the goal of a remedy can be seen from its ety-
mology: the word “remedy” derives from the Latin “re” (meaning 
“again” or “back”) and “medeor (meaning “to heal”), and “mede-
or” in turn comes from the Proto-Indo-European root “med”
(meaning “take appropriate measure,” “measure,” “heal,” “allot,”
or “give”).23 Thus, very literally, a remedy is something that aims to 
measure back or again, or to allot (or give) back or again. Or, 
phrased only slightly differently: a remedy, very literally, is some-
thing that aims to give a person back what he had, or to put a per-
son back to where he was—back to where he was before one or 
more of his legal rights were violated.
Of course, different areas of private law have different subject 
matter and different doctrines, and thus remedies in different do-
mains may appear to be quite different. Despite these differences, 
however, they all seek to remedy the violation of a right by bring-
ing a party back to where he would have been but for the wrong.
For instance, in contracts, the three typical metrics for damages 
for breach of contract are the expectation interest, reliance inter-
est, and restitution interest.24 While each of these metrics is differ-
ent, each of them employs the notion of returning a party to the 
level that he was at, albeit employing this notion with respect to 
different times and different people. Expectation damages and re-
liance damages focus on the position of the non-breacher, and 
they aim to put the non-breacher in the position that he would 
have been in given a particular counterfactual situation. With ex-
pectation damages, we seek to put the non-breacher in the posi-
tion he would have been in if the contract had been performed; 
with reliance damages, we seek to put the non-breacher in the po-
sition he would have been in if the contract had never been en-
23. See Remedy, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/
remedy#etymonline_v_10401 (last visited Jan 5, 2020).
24. See generally Craswell, supra note 17; Fuller and Perdue, supra note 17. Specific per-
formance is also a remedy used in contract law. Unlike the three damages measures, specific 
performance is an equitable remedy, and it simply requires that a breacher do as he had 
promised he would. Thus, specific performance does not employ the notion of bringing the 
non-breacher back to where he had been before the breach, and thus it also does not em-
ploy the notion of “the level that one was at.” To the extent that specific performance is per-
formed, however, and to the extent that there either are no consequential losses or the non-
breacher is compensated for them, specific performance presumably does bring the non-
breacher back to where he had been before the breach, and to the (financial or happiness) 
level at which the non-breacher was, because the non-breacher does end up receiving the 
very thing he was promised. Thus, specific performance is consistent with the goal of return-
ing a non-breacher to the (financial or happiness) level that he was at before breach, even if 
it does not explicitly employ these terms.
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tered into. The restitution interest employs the notion of the “level 
that he would have been at” as well, but it tracks this level for the 
breacher. With restitution damages, we seek to put the breacher 
back at the level at which he would have been if he had not en-
tered into the contract, and the disgorged gains that bring the 
breacher back to this level are then transferred to the non-
breacher.
The notion of the level at which one would have been is also a 
key notion in torts. According to the corrective justice theory of 
torts, the underlying goal of torts is generally to make the ag-
grieved party whole and to compensate him for his losses.25 Thus, 
the goal is to put the aggrieved party in the position that he would 
have been in but for the tortious activity of the defendant. Even 
economists who deny that corrective justice is the goal—or the 
fundamental principle—of tort law will generally recognize that a 
collateral benefit of tort law is that it brings an aggrieved party 
back to the level that he would have been at but for the tortious 
behavior.26
The notion of the level at which one would have been is also a 
key concept employed throughout other private law areas, includ-
ing property and unjust enrichment. In requiring a party to com-
pensate another party for losses arising due to property claims, 
remedies seek to bring the aggrieved party back to the position he 
would have been in if not for his property-related harm. In unjust 
enrichment and restitution cases,27 too, remedies focus on bringing 
25. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory, see COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 15; Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra 
note 15; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 15; WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 
15.
26. On a different, but related note, for an explanation of why the economist’s account 
can be understood to require and employ corrective justice, see Richard A. Posner, The Con-
cept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201 (1981) (“Once 
the concept of corrective justice is given its correct Aristotelian meaning, it becomes possi-
ble to show that it is not only compatible with, but required by, the economic theory of 
law.”). For my exploration into the long-standing debate between economists and corrective 
justice theorists regarding whether tort law is and or should be forward-looking or backward-
looking, and for my argument that the debate rests on a false assumption, see Pressman, su-
pra note 16.
27. While some unjust enrichment and restitution claims arise out of other substantive 
areas of private law, there are also some that arguably are free-standing claims. Whether and 
the extent to which they constitute their own substantive area of the law has been a topic of 
much recent debate. See Richard Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1369 (1994); Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1465 (1994); Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Com-
pensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2011); Chaim Saiman, 
Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28 OX. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 99 (2008); Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L. 1 (2000).
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the unjustly enriched party back to the position that he would have 
been in if not for his having unjustly enriched himself.
Further, there is also a whole body of recent literature about the 
alleged asymmetry in the law’s treatment of gains and losses (e.g. 
torts versus unjust enrichment),28 and these debates constitute yet 
another area that makes use of the notion of “the level that one is 
at.” Indeed, without this notion, these debates could not even get 
off the ground. All of the quantifications for both torts and unjust 
enrichment are determined to be gains or losses with respect to a 
particular baseline value. It is taken as a given that there is a base-
line level (be it a baseline level of happiness or a baseline financial 
position), and the questions raised and addressed in these debates 
are about how and why shifts from the baseline brought about by 
others can or should be treated similarly or differently.
In addition to these areas of private law employing the notion of 
returning an aggrieved party to “the level that the person was at,”
there are also various non-private-law areas that seem to have the 
same remedial goal. One such example is the compensation stat-
utes that many states have for people who have been wrongfully 
convicted and incarcerated.29 Although some have argued that 
these statutes actually can or should track principles of restitu-
tion,30 the most straightforward way of understanding them is 
providing tort-like compensation that seeks to compensate those 
who were wrongly incarcerated for the wrongs (and disutility) that 
were incurred. To the extent that this is the case—and even to the 
extent that principles of restitution explain these statutes—these 
statutes invoke the same remedial principle of returning a party
(be it the plaintiff or the government) to the position that the par-
ty was in before the harm (or unjust enrichment) occurred. Thus, 
28. See generally Richard Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1369, 1371 (1994) (“It is commonplace in modern discussion to dispute the usefulness of 
any line between harm inflicted and benefit conferred and by implication the distinction 
between restitution and tort, between, as it were, the harm principle and the benefit princi-
ple. Everything is said to turn on the choice of the appropriate baseline by which these cal-
culations are made.”); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985); Ariel 
Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189
(2009).
29. These compensation statutes typically allow exonerees to obtain compensation 
without having to file a lawsuit and without having to show that official misconduct caused 
the incarceration. See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly 
Convicted: What Works, What Doesn’t’ and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403 (2009). Different 
states offer different amounts of compensation (and some states do not have compensation 
statutes at all). See, e.g., ALA CODE § 29-2-159(a) (Westlaw through Act 2016-54 of the 2016 
Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84(a) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.052(a) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 
84th Leg.).
30. See generally Erik Encarnacion, Why and How to Compensate Exonerees, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 139 (2015).
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these statutes also invoke the notion of “the level that the person 
was at.”
In sum, the notion of “the position that one was in” or “the level 
that one was at” is ubiquitous in the law. This notion is particularly 
prevalent in private law areas, and especially so in private law rem-
edies—the entire purpose of which is arguably to return a party to 
the position that he was in or the level that he was at but for a 
harm that he incurred. In light of the term’s ubiquity, it will serve 
us well to further probe it to ensure that we understand its mean-
ing.
B. “The Level that One Was at” Is a Notion Both in Terms of Money and 
Happiness, but the Happiness Version Has Intrinsic Importance and the 
Money Version Has Mere Instrumental Importance
Up until now, I have been referring to the remedial notion as 
returning a person to the “position he was in” or to the “level he 
was at” before the harm. As I will argue, this phrase is vague, im-
precise, and under-described in various ways—many of which are 
not immediately apparent. One, however, is somewhat more ap-
parent than the rest, though it too typically goes unnoticed: are we 
talking about returning a person to the “position he was in” before 
the harm in terms of money, happiness, or something else?
After all, on the one hand, it seems that remedies awarded by 
courts are typically economic and that the harms for which one 
might seek a legal remedy are usually economic. On the other 
hand, some harms for which one might seek a legal remedy are 
non-economic in nature. These non-economic harms are typically 
harms associated with the loss of happiness or the infliction of pain 
or suffering. Furthermore, it seems that one’s economic position is 
only valuable to the extent that it affects one’s position in terms of 
happiness.
In light of the fact that these related but non-identical domains 
(money and happiness) both potentially could be a good that “the 
position he was in” or “the level he was at” refers to, which is it that 
we are after in the law? When the law seeks to use a legal remedy to 
return a person to “the position he was in” or “the level he was at,”
is it happiness or money that it has in mind? In short, I think that 
the answer is that we are generally referring to money, but that 
money is used merely because it is a good proxy for what we actual-
ly care about—returning a person to “the position he was in” or 
“the level he was at” in terms of happiness.
As a practical matter, we generally speak in economic terms. We 
talk about putting a party back into a financial position that he 
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would have been in and label the level that a person was at in 
terms of his financial position. Further, not only do we label the 
position that the person was at in terms of finances, we also deter-
mine the amount of the remedy in terms of money. Money is the 
currency of our legal system. If someone owes a transfer to a party 
that he harmed, we generally require the party that has done the 
harming to make the aggrieved party whole by paying money to 
the aggrieved party. Furthermore, this is the case even if the harm 
done to a person is not only (or at all) financial. Even if the harm 
done is more than financial—as perhaps is the case in torts where 
there is a claim for pain and suffering or non-economic damages 
of this sort—the transfer from the harming party to the harmed 
party is still typically made in terms of money.
Money, however, is clearly a mere proxy for what we actually 
care about—be it happiness or some other feature of what we ex-
perience in life—and even law-and-economics theorists will in al-
most all cases agree to this.31 After all, money does not have intrin-
sic value. It has merely instrumental value. Money has value 
because of the goods it enables a person to buy, and these goods 
are valuable because of how they affect a person’s life. More specif-
ically, these goods are valuable because of how they affect a per-
son’s conscious experiences—e.g., how a person’s happiness is af-
fected. It can be contested that everything of value boils down to 
happiness, but this is not an unreasonable or outlandish assump-
tion, and it is one under which I will operate. Furthermore, while 
there might be some who do not believe that everything of value 
boils down to happiness (perhaps instead maintaining that things 
such as health or friendships or things of this nature have intrinsic 
31. Even Richard Posner, whose original view was that tort law’s goal is to maximize 
wealth—as opposed to happiness or something else that has clear value—has changed his 
view over the years. Instead of espousing a view of tort law according to which tort law seeks 
to maximize economic efficiency (i.e., maximize wealth), he now espouses a view according 
to which tort law seeks to maximize happiness. See Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and 
Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. 
Owen ed., 1995). In switching to this view, Posner adopted the typical view shared by mem-
bers of the law and economics movement both then and today. Of course, the fact that Pos-
ner previously endorsed a view according to which the goal of tort law is the maximization 
of wealth does not necessarily speak to what he viewed as being of intrinsic value and what 
he viewed as being of merely instrumental value. After all, one could think that the goal of 
tort law is to maximize wealth even if one views wealth (i.e., money) as merely of instrumen-
tal value. The fact that one seeks to maximize something in the domain of tort law does not 
mean that it is what one seeks to maximize overall, summing over all domains of society and 
life. Notwithstanding this, however, the change in Posner’s view about the purpose of tort 
law is notable.
As for what constitutes the general position of economists about the value of money, it 
seems fair to say that it is a consensus view, even among economists, that money does not 
have intrinsic value, but, rather, that it merely has instrumental value. See, e.g., Sunstein &
Posner, supra note 2.
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value), even people in this camp will likely agree that money is not 
one of the things that has intrinsic value. And, crucially, the ques-
tions that I address in this Article will be just as relevant and im-
portant to answer even for those who think that things other than 
happiness have intrinsic value and that not everything boils down 
to happiness. Thus, although, going forward, I will explore the is-
sues here through a happiness lens, readers could instead substi-
tute in for happiness another feature of experience that they be-
lieve has intrinsic value, and my discussions will have similar force 
in that other context. Theorists operating with other accounts of 
value will confront the same questions that I will be raising here. 
Thus, this Article’s discussions are equally important for those who 
do not think that all value boils down to happiness. Notwithstand-
ing this, I will continue to carry out my discussions through a hap-
piness lens.
Despite happiness being what we actually care about, we operate 
in terms of money because it works better in two respects. First, it 
works better for assessing “the level a person was at” and the level 
that the person now is at, or described differently, the distance 
from a person’s original level that a person was shifted due to hav-
ing his legal rights violated by someone else. Money works well 
both because many—if not most—harms that one can get a legal 
remedy for are purely economic harms, and because even for non-
economic harms, money is, in (very) broad strokes, a decent proxy 
for happiness—even if not in every way.32 As for why this works just 
as well as if not better than assessing the amount of happiness lost 
(or the levels of happiness before and after the harm): in cases of 
pure financial loss, the return to one’s financial position will fully33
remedy the loss so a happiness metric would, at best, do equally 
well as the financial metric; and in cases where there is non-
32. Surely, as a general matter, money is not a fantastic proxy for happiness. After all, 
except, perhaps, in cases of extreme poverty, we would have very little sense of how happy a 
person is by looking at his overall wealth. Despite this, in the context of many types of loss of 
happiness due to a harm, it seems that providing money can do a decent job, in broad 
strokes, of transferring happiness to a plaintiff. People do generally prefer more money to 
less money, and thus we can assume in typical cases that money has value. Thus, typically a 
transfer of money will bring about a transfer of happiness to a person, and the correlation 
between awards of money and awards of happiness would thus likely be positive. It seems 
that money is at least as good of a proxy as anything else that the legal system could use.
33. There are of course important questions that can be asked about whether a party is 
truly made whole even when the loss is purely financial and the party is then compensated 
for the full financial amount. A party could seemingly still be (and in fact usually still is) 
worse off after the whole ordeal, and this could be for various reasons, including, for exam-
ple, the hassle and stress and time spent in the attempt to get compensated for the loss. 
While these are important concerns, I leave these types of concerns aside for the purposes of 
simplifying the current discussion. Thus, I assume (counterfactually) that being compen-
sated for a purely financial loss in the amount that was lost would indeed make a party 
whole.
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economic loss, while perhaps a happiness metric could be more 
tailored to happiness than the monetary proxy, happiness presents 
(at least prima facie) various difficulties regarding quantification 
(especially in the context of quantifying the happiness level of a 
single moment of conscious experience), so the financial proxy 
seems to be our best bet.34
Second, money works better as a currency for transfer. While 
perhaps happiness could be transferred in non-monetary ways 
from a defendant to a plaintiff, happiness is hard to quantify and 
hard to transfer, and money is a tangible thing that can be easily 
quantified and easily transferred. Thus, even if money is a proxy 
for happiness and thus not perfectly tailored to what we care 
about, using it for transfers has important practical benefits.
Despite these good reasons for operating in money, however, it 
is important to be clear that money is used as a proxy for happi-
ness. Happiness is what we do and should care about intrinsically. 
Thus, while we typically talk in terms of money when we talk about 
returning a person to ‘the level that he was at’, what we really want 
is to bring a party back to the happiness level that he would have 
been at but for the event that harmed him, and what we really want 
is for this to be brought about by the defendant transferring a cer-
tain amount of happiness back to the plaintiff.
Thus, in sum, “the level that one is at” is a notion both in terms 
of money and happiness, but the happiness version has intrinsic 
importance and the money version has mere instrumental im-
portance.
C. Ways in Which the Notion of “the Level that One Was at” in 
Terms of Happiness Is Imprecise
I’ve said that the goal of private law remedies is to bring a per-
son back to “the position that he was in” or “the level that he was 
at,” and since I have established that money is just a proxy for hap-
piness, the goal of private law remedies is to bring a person back to 
this position in terms of happiness. Thus, if we want to explore and 
understand the notion of “the position that a person was in” or 
“the level that one was at,” we must do so in the context of happi-
ness.
34. These “various difficulties regarding quantification (especially in the context of 
quantifying the happiness level of a single moment of conscious experience)” that using the 
domain of happiness would at least prima facie present—be they true difficulties or not—
will be addressed throughout this Article, but, in particular, in Part III.
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Once we shift gears and focus on understanding this notion in 
terms of happiness instead of money, however, it becomes a bit less 
clear what the phrase means. In terms of money, it’s fairly clear 
what the phrase means. “The financial position that a person is in”
and “the money level that one is at,” while not completely specific, 
pretty clearly refer to the amount of money that a person has at the 
time in question. Perhaps there could be some questions about 
how this financial position should account for things such as ex-
pected future income or one’s potential future earning capacity, 
but generally speaking, it seems pretty clear how to assess a per-
son’s financial situation: sum up a person’s assets and liabilities 
and calculate on net how much money the person owns.
It is much less clear how to understand the notion of “the posi-
tion that a person is in” and “the level that one is at” in terms of 
happiness. This is for three reasons, all of which have to do with 
ways in which the phrase is quite under-described, and thus vague. 
First, we confront questions about how to quantify and measure 
the amount of happiness of a particular moment—both as a theo-
retical matter and as a practical matter. Second, we confront ques-
tions about which moment and perhaps which group of moments are 
the ones that we are trying to quantify the happiness of. Third, if it 
is a group of moments that we are trying to quantify the happiness of, 
there is a question of what aggregation mechanism (i.e., function) 
to use to determine the value of the whole, once we know (and tak-
ing as given) the values of the individual parts.
1. The First Imprecision: Quantifying the 
Happiness at a Particular Moment
If we are going to be talking about a happiness level, it seems 
that we will need to be able to articulate a metric for quantifying 
happiness and that we will also need some way of identifying what
level of happiness a person is at, using that metric. Articulating the 
metric is a theoretical task and identifying what level of happiness a 
person is at, using that metric, is a practical task. These two tasks 
are related, however. Leaving aside the question of identifying 
what level of happiness a person is at, at least for the time being, as 
a practical hurdle, we can focus on the theoretical question of ar-
ticulating a metric for quantifying happiness. What is the unit of 
happiness? Supposing we call a unit of happiness a “util,” what is 
one util? How much happiness is that? Absent a metric of some 
sort that is articulated, it is unclear how we could go about refer-
ring to a level of happiness, and it is even less clear how one could 
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go about articulating or picking out a particular level of happiness 
that one attributes to a particular person at a particular moment.
We seemingly do not currently have a metric for happiness, but 
that does not mean that one cannot be articulated. If we are going 
to be referring to happiness levels, however, it seems that articulat-
ing a metric for quantifying the level of happiness at a particular 
moment is something that we probably have to do first.
2. The Second Imprecision: the Temporal Component of the 
Account of Happiness Quantification, and a Preliminary Attempt 
to Specify the Temporal Component
Even if the first question is answered (i.e., even if we articulate a 
metric for quantifying happiness, and even if we solve the practical 
problem of how to identify how much happiness a particular per-
son has at a particular time using that metric), there is still a sec-
ond question about what precisely we mean when we refer to a 
person’s happiness level. In particular, there seems to be a key 
question of what we mean in terms of the dimension of time. After 
all, it seems that a person’s happiness level is a property of a con-
scious experience at a particular moment of time. In light of this, 
we need to be more precise when we say that we want to return a 
person to a particular level of happiness.
In saying that we want to return a person to a level of happiness, 
what moment in time of a person’s life is the relevant moment for 
assessing the level of happiness that a person was at before the 
harm? The moment right before the harm occurred? Additionally, 
since a level of happiness is a property of a particular moment of 
experience, which moment of a person’s life is it that we are trying 
to increase the happiness of to match that prior moment? In light 
of these questions, it seems that we need to make sense of two 
things: (1) the temporal component of the happiness level that a 
person was at before the harm, and (2) the temporal component 
of the happiness level that we are attempting to bring a person to 
(since we obviously cannot go back and change the happiness level 
at any moment in the past).
There seem to be various possible answers to these questions 
about the temporal nature of the phrase “the happiness level that 
one is at,” some of which are the following.
First, as just mentioned, one option would be that we want to re-
turn the happiness of a particular moment to what it would have 
been if not for the harm. As just stated, however, this option is not 
possible because we cannot change the past.
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Second, another option is that we are seeking to increase the 
happiness of a particular moment in the future as a remedy for the 
harm that occurred to a different moment, which occurred in the 
past. There are various ways in which one might attempt to carry 
out this option. One might seek to return a person to the happi-
ness level he was at by (1) returning a person’s happiness level at 
one particular moment in the future to the level that some past 
moment, which was affected by the harm, would have been at but 
for the harm, or (2) increasing the happiness of some future mo-
ment, above what it otherwise would have been, to compensate for 
the harm (i.e., the decrease in happiness) to some past moment as 
a result of the harm. It seems pretty clear, however, that neither of 
these two ways (or other possible ways) of making sense of bringing 
a single future moment to some increased level as a remedy for a 
harm (i.e., decrease in happiness) to a single past moment, is what 
we are after.
Focusing on a decrease to only single moment and then focus-
ing on an increase to only a single moment, regardless of how this 
is carried out, does not seem to fully capture the harms and reme-
dies that we are after. It seems that we need to broaden our tem-
poral focus beyond a single moment and beyond a pair of mo-
ments.
In line with my hypothesis that we need to broaden our focus 
beyond a moment or a pair of moments, I offer two additional op-
tions that capture extended periods of time. First, perhaps we are 
seeking to return a person’s happiness level for his whole future to 
what it would have been if not for the harm. Second, perhaps we 
are seeking to return a person’s happiness level for his whole life
back to what it would have been if not for the harm.
These two temporally extended options seem to be much better 
candidates for what we are talking about when we talk about seek-
ing to return a person’s happiness level to what it would have been 
if not for the harm. Which one is more plausible? Given that we 
can’t change the past, it seems that these two temporal accounts 
are quite similar, and they might even be identical for all practical 
purposes (i.e., they might give us the same prescriptions in all pos-
sible cases). Seemingly, whatever brings a person’s happiness level 
for his future back to what it would have been if not for the harm, 
will also be what brings a person’s happiness level for his whole life 
back to what it would have been if not for the harm. I will discuss 
later, in Part V, why this is not quite true, and I will at that time ex-
plore differences between the two accounts. For the time being, 
however, in light of the great similarity between these two ac-
counts, I will treat them interchangeably. Further, for the sake of 
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simplicity, and since we cannot change the past, I will for the time 
being refer to both views as the view that considers the “happiness 
level one is at” to refer to the happiness level of a person’s future
(and not of his whole life, which would also include his past).
What we seem to care about is the happiness level of a person’s
future. Thus, the current hypothesis under exploration is that what 
we mean by returning a person to the happiness level that he 
would have been at if not for the harm is: First, we estimate the 
happiness level that a person had in store in his future before the 
harm occurred. Second, we look at the person’s life where the 
harm has occurred and estimate the happiness level that the per-
son now has in store for his future. We then seek to return the 
happiness level of the person’s future in the second case to the 
happiness level of the person’s future in the first case, and we seek 
to do so by adding an amount of happiness to the person’s future 
in the second case that will bring about the result that the happi-
ness level of the future in the second case is equally as good as the 
happiness level of the person’s future in the first case.
Before continuing this discussion, I now offer a brief aside about 
money and how this second imprecision that I’ve stated affects an 
account of happiness (regarding the temporal component of the 
analysis of “the level that a person is at”) in fact does apply to that 
analysis in the context of money as well.
3. An Aside About How the Imprecision Regarding the Temporal 
Component Also Applies to an Account of “the Level that One Was 
at” in Terms of Money
a. A Similarity Between Happiness and Money with 
Respect to the Temporal Component
Recall that, in the context of money (unlike in the context of 
happiness), it seems fairly easy to make sense of the notion of “re-
turning a person to the level that he was at.” As I stated, it seems 
that in the context of money we can simply calculate a person’s fi-
nancial position or “level” by summing his assets and liabilities and 
coming to a net sum of money that he has, and it seems that this 
constitutes the financial position or “level” that the person is at. In-
terestingly, however, upon further examination, it seems that the 
temporal characterization of what we actually mean by the phrase 
“returning a person to the happiness level that he was at” (i.e., re-
ferring to the happiness level of one’s whole future) is a character-
ization that symmetrically would apply to the phrase in the finan-
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cial context. Just as in the context of happiness what we seem to 
care about is one’s happiness going forward, it seems that what we 
care about in the financial context is one’s financial capability go-
ing forward. Although it does seem that happiness and money are 
symmetrical in this case, I don’t think that this means that I was 
wrong to say that the financial context could (generally) be calcu-
lated by looking at how much money a person has in the present. 
It seems that a person’s financial capability for his future consists 
of future income plus his current amount of money owned. Fur-
ther, for many financial harms, it is one’s currently possessed mon-
ey that is depleted. Thus, it seems that in most cases a person can 
be returned to the financial position that he was at (which I’m now 
saying we should understand as his financial position for his future)
by merely returning his currently possessed money to the amount 
that it would have been if not for the harm.
While the focus of the following discussions will be happiness 
and not money, it is important to have clarified that in both con-
texts, when we talk about the notion in remedies of “returning a 
person to the position he was in” or “returning a person to the lev-
el he was at,” this refers to making it the case that we are attempt-
ing to provide the person with a whole future of the same level of 
money or happiness that he would have had if not for the harm in-
curred.
It’s also important to be clear that I’m not saying that the ubiq-
uitous remedial notion of “returning a person to the position he 
was in” or “returning a person to the level he was at” is mistaken. 
It’s not. It’s just that it is a somewhat misleading term if one does 
not realize that it is shorthand. The goal of providing a remedy 
seems to be not exactly returning a person to the level that a per-
son was at before the harm, but, rather, returning the level (be it in 
terms of happiness or money) of a person’s expected future after the 
harm to the level of the person’s expected future before the harm was 
incurred. This important clarification not only will pave the way for 
the discussions and findings later in this Article, but it is also worth 
taking note of in its own right.
b. A Difference Between Happiness and Money with Respect to the 
Temporal Component, and the Beginnings of a Lead-in to the 
Third Imprecision Regarding Happiness
Despite the fact that it seems that what we care about in both the 
money and happiness contexts is one’s future, there is an im-
portant difference between money and happiness (and identifying 
this difference also begins to put us on notice about something re-
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lated to the third imprecision in the context of happiness; it thus 
serves as a bit of a lead-in to that topic). We can seemingly calcu-
late a person’s financial position for the future by looking primari-
ly at the present moment, whereas we cannot do this for happiness. 
(I’ve said that in the context of money we also must consider fu-
ture income and expenses etc., but, leaving that aspect aside, look-
ing at a person’s current net financial assets will dictate how much 
money a person has for his future.) The inquiry into happiness, 
however, does not admit of the short cut of looking primarily at 
the present and determining how much happiness a person cur-
rently possesses that can be used as a store of happiness to be dis-
tributed over one’s future years. The difference is that the money 
that a person will spend in his future can be possessed by the per-
son now in the present, whereas the happiness that a person will 
experience in his future is not in any sense possessed by the person 
now in the present. Money can be collected and possessed before it 
is spent, but happiness does not have an analogous feature.35
Leaving behind this subection’s aside regarding money, howev-
er, I now return to the discussion of happiness and the hypothesis 
that the goal of a remedy is to provide a person with a future of the 
same happiness level that his future would have had if not for the 
harm incurred.
35. While I think that the clarification that I’ve made about the “level a person is at”
even in the money context is one that should be understood as one that applies temporally 
to one’s future, I think that the observations in this paragraph about how current money 
(unlike happiness) can serve as a store for future spending helps perhaps explain what 
might have led to our typically using the shorthand that we do use in the context of money. 
Since the money that we possess at a single moment can actually represent the money that 
one will be able to spend in the future (or at least some portion of it, which in some cases 
might be a large portion of it), this means that in the money context there is less of a differ-
ence between one’s situation for a single moment and one’s situation for one’s future. 
Therefore, in the money context (but not in the happiness context), there is good reason 
for using one’s “financial position in the current moment” as shorthand for one’s “financial 
position for the future.” These notions are more closely tied together than my discussion 
might have made them seem, and the shorthand can be understood even if it is interpreted 
literally and not interpreted as shorthand. Because of the differences between money and 
happiness discussed in the textual paragraph that this footnote accompanies, however, using 
the current happiness level to refer to one’s future happiness level is a maneuver that does 
not make sense unless one understands it purely as shorthand. It is this difference between 
money and happiness that originally led me above, in Part II.C.1, to state that while under-
standing the notion of the “the level that one was at” in terms of money is straightforward 
enough, it is much less clear how to understand this notion in the context of happiness, 
and, in particular, this is because the notion in the context of happiness is under-described 
and thus vague in various ways—three of which I have been and will be describing in Part II 
of this Article.
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4. The Third Imprecision: The Existence of Different Possible 
Ways to Aggregate the Happiness of Component Moments to 
Determine the Happiness of a Temporal Chunk of Moments
I’ve argued that the notion of “the level of happiness that one 
was at” is vague and under-described in two ways. First, we have not 
yet articulated a metric for quantifying happiness. Second, even if 
we were to articulate a metric for quantifying happiness, I argued 
that the notion of “the level of happiness that one was at” is vague 
and under-described because it did not articulate the temporal 
context that it applies to. In this past subection, however, I argued 
that the temporal context that we have in mind is a person’s fu-
ture.
While this notion of bringing a person’s happiness for the re-
mainder of his life to the level that it would have been at if not for 
the harm seems like a straightforward notion, even this notion is 
not as precise as it might seem. Even if we have articulated a metric 
for quantifying happiness and even if we have determined that the 
relevant temporal context is the remainder of a person’s life, the 
notion of a person’s happiness level is still under-described.
Given the happiness level of a particular moment, and given the 
decision about which group of moments are the relevant ones (i.e.,
all of those in a person’s future), we still have a question of what 
our aggregation mechanism or function is for assessing the value 
of the whole (i.e., the remainder of the person’s life) given the 
value of the parts (i.e., the values of each of the moments in the 
remainder of the person’s life). In other words, even assuming we 
have a way to quantify happiness at a particular moment, and even 
if we know which moments are the ones that are relevant, there is a 
question of what the best way is to quantify the happiness of a tem-
poral chunk of life that includes many moments. How do we ag-
gregate the happiness of the moments when assessing the happi-
ness of a chunk of time that is composed of many moments? This 
type of a decision about how to determine the value of a whole al-
ways has to be made when one is trying to determine the value of a 
whole but one only has, as inputs, the values of the parts.
There are various aggregation mechanisms or methods that 
could be used. Perhaps the most straightforward option would be 
to use TU-type aggregation, which employs sum aggregation. Ac-
cording to this aggregation method, the value of a portion of a life 
is equal to the sum of the units of happiness that one experiences 
at each moment during the portion of life in question. Another 
option, however, would be to use AU-type aggregation. According 
to this aggregation method, the value of a portion of a life is equal 
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to the average of the values of units of happiness that one experi-
ences at each moment during the portion of life in question. Hy-
brid combinations of AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggrega-
tion provide further possibilities. Further still, there might be some 
alternative functions for going from the value of the parts to the 
value of the whole that are neither AU-type aggregation, TU-type 
aggregation, nor even a hybrid of these two aggregation types. 
Perhaps some other function could be used.
In light of these different options, even if we have a metric for 
quantifying happiness at a particular moment, and even if we are 
operating within a framework of having a “person’s happiness lev-
el” refer to the temporal period that includes the remainder of a 
person’s life (which itself was not an obvious or foregone conclu-
sion), it still would not be completely clear how one would quantify 
the happiness level of the remainder of one’s life. There are dif-
ferent options for what should be one’s aggregation function, and 
it is not obvious which is the correct one.
If, however, we are to have a sound theory of returning a person 
to the level he was at, it seems that we must answer all the ques-
tions I have raised, including the last one regarding which aggrega-
tion mechanism to choose. We seemingly cannot merely use vague 
terms and let our analysis stop there. It seems that we must be 
more precise: It seems that we must have an account that explains 
precisely what it is that we mean when we say “the level that a per-
son was at.”
D. Despite the Imprecision in the Account of Happiness Quantification, 
Private Law Remedies Appear to Still Do Just Fine and 
Get the Right Results
If we are to have a coherent account of “the level that a person 
was at,” it seems that we need to answer the questions that I raised 
above. Further, as I say, it seems that a more precise account has 
not been offered. Despite this, however, it seems that the law might 
be doing just fine. Why is this? How is the law able to provide rem-
edies that seem to bring a person back to the “position that he was 
in” or “the level that he was at” if these terms are vague, under-
described, and lacking content?
It seems that the answer is that, in typical cases, we do not need 
to have a more precise theory in the ways I say we should, and this 
is because the choice of which more precise theory to offer does 
not have a bearing on the result in most cases. In other words, all 
of the more precise theories would prescribe the same result in 
most cases, and thus it does not seem to matter which of the more 
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precise theories we espouse. Further, it seems that it is this very 
fact—that the choice of a more precise theory seemingly does not 
affect our prescriptions—that has made it the case that we have not 
articulated a more precise theory. Cases don’t seem to require that 
we be more precise, and if we aren’t required to be more precise, it 
is both the case that (1) we might not realize that there is some 
lingering vagueness, and (2) even if we were to notice the linger-
ing vagueness, we might not feel the need to put in the effort to be 
more precise than we need to be.
So how and why is it the case that there seemingly is usually no 
need to be more precise with our theory, and how is it the case that 
all of our potential theories would seemingly yield the same pre-
scriptions in most cases? I will now show why this is the case.
1. Cases of Economic (Financial) Loss
The most typical cases (be they in contract, tort, or some other 
area in private law) involve a person suffering a harm that is purely 
economic—a financial loss. If a person’s losses are merely finan-
cial, it seems that being compensated financially in the amount of 
the financial loss will put the person back to the happiness level he 
was originally at, regardless of which precise happiness theory we 
use.36 This seems to be the case even though we do not even at-
tempt to articulate a theory in terms of happiness (much less, a 
theory of happiness that is fully specific in the ways that I’ve dis-
cussed in the previous sections). Further, this seems to be the case 
even though we do not attempt to articulate (1) what the happi-
ness level of the person was before the loss, (2) the happiness level 
of the person after the loss, or (3) the amount of happiness lost.
Consider, for example, a car with a suitcase in it. Suppose that 
the suitcase is removed from the car, but we then want to return 
the car to the weight it was when it contained the suitcase. In order 
to do so, we need not necessarily know the pre-removal weight of 
the car, the post-removal weight of the car, or even the weight of 
36. There are of course questions that can be asked about whether a party is truly made 
whole even when the loss is purely financial and the party is then compensated for the full
financial amount. A party could still be (and in fact usually still is) worse off after the whole 
ordeal, and this could be for various reasons, including, for example, the hassle and stress 
and time spent in the attempt to get compensated for the loss (and, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the large portion of a plaintiff’s judgment that goes to the plaintiff’s attorney!). 
While these all are very important concerns, I leave these types of practical concerns aside 
for the purposes of the current discussion. While these concerns are very real, they are or-
thogonal to and do not bear on the topic being discussed here. Thus, I assume (counterfac-
tually) that being compensated for a purely financial loss in the amount that was lost would 
indeed make a party whole.
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the suitcase. Instead, we can avoid inquiries into these amounts by 
either putting the suitcase itself back in the car, or by putting 
something in the car that we have deemed to be of equal weight to 
the suitcase. (We could in various ways deem something to be the 
same weight of the suitcase without knowing what this weight is. 
Among these methods would be putting the suitcase and the new 
object on a balance to determine that they are the same weight—
whatever weight that might be.)
Thus, in cases where the loss is only financial, it seems that any 
happiness theory that we might espouse would yield the same pre-
scriptions. And regardless of which theory we espouse, giving the 
aggrieved party the money that he lost would bring the party back 
to the level of happiness at which he had been prior to incurring 
the loss.
2. Cases of Non-Economic Harms 
(e.g., damages for pain and suffering)
Not all cases have losses limited to financial losses, however. 
Some tort cases, for example, involve claims for non-economic 
damages such as pain and suffering (be these the only claims in a 
case or be they in addition to claims for financial losses).37 Perhaps, 
one might think, these cases would require us to articulate an ac-
count of “the level that one was at” in terms of happiness—and 
perhaps even an account of happiness quantification that is fully 
specific in the ways that I’ve discussed in the previous Section. 
While it might seem prima facie as though this is the case, I do not 
think that it is in fact the case. Just as with the cases where losses 
are only financial, cases of non-economic harms do not seem to 
require us to choose among the theories of happiness quantifica-
tion.
The difference between the case of non-economic damages and 
the case of economic damages is that in the economic case the loss 
has already been quantified in terms of money, whereas in the 
non-economic case it has not. But this, however, does not mean 
that we are confronted with any of the questions I’ve discussed 
37. It is of course also the case, however, that even cases of straightforward financial 
loss might in fact involve a loss of happiness more than simply the lost funds. After all, it 
seems ceteris paribus preferable never to lose one’s money than to lose it and be refunded 
later, especially in light of the fact that this might take considerable time as well as involve-
ment in legal proceedings. Notwithstanding this important practical wrinkle, I will assume, 
for the purposes of my discussion, that the compensatory sums in purely financial cases do 
indeed make a party whole and also that the compensatory sums here in cases of non-
economic damages also do indeed make a party whole.
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above in terms of articulating a theory of happiness and in terms of 
how to precisify the theory of happiness. We need not articulate a 
theory of how to articulate or quantify happiness at a particular 
moment, and we also need not articulate a theory of how to quan-
tify the happiness of a period of time consisting of many moments 
once we have happiness values for each of the time-period’s com-
ponent moments. The reason that we do not need to articulate 
these things is that we need not articulate (1) what the person’s
happiness level was before the loss, (2) what the person’s happi-
ness level was after the loss, or (3) how much happiness was lost.
Why is this? This is for the same reasons as in the purely eco-
nomic case, and as illustrated by the example of the car and the 
suitcase in that context. Here, we need only figure out what the 
monetary value of the lost happiness is.38 (In the context of money, 
we needed only figure out how much money was lost, or to put it in 
a parallel—but more awkward—form: In the context of money, we 
needed only figure out what the monetary value of the lost money 
was.) Since the damages measure is an economic one even in the 
case of non-economic harms, we need only determine how much 
money it will take to bring the person back to the happiness level 
that he was at (or, similarly, how much money it will take to bring 
the person the amount of happiness that he had lost). We need 
not articulate how many units of happiness this happiness transfer 
amounts to, and we also need not articulate what levels of happi-
ness the person was at before and or after the loss.
Interestingly, even if the remedy in court were non-financial and 
amounted somehow to a transfer of happiness in some other way, 
it might still be that we could avoid the various above questions. It 
could be that we would then simply need to somehow do some-
thing akin to putting the happiness loss on one side of a balance 
(i.e., a “happiness balance”) and figure out what would even the 
balance if it were put on the other side, and then give the plaintiff 
whatever this is. There are further questions about whether a ma-
neuver of this sort actually would amount to determining a meas-
ure of happiness and thus determining what amount of happiness 
was lost (because it is not immediately obvious what would consti-
38. For the purposes of this discussion, the “we” who is figuring out the monetary value 
of the lost happiness could be anyone. It is meant to refer to anybody at all who attempts to 
estimate how much money the correct amount is. For example, an estimate of this sort 
could be made by the aggrieved party himself, by the courts, or by anybody else whatsoever. 
Of course, the more that a person knows about the facts of the situation and about the facts 
about the aggrieved party, the more likely that it probably is for one’s estimate to be accu-
rate. For further discussion about questions related to how this estimate of the correct com-
pensation amount is made, see Part V, infra. For further discussion about questions related 
to who should be making this estimate for the purposes of private law, see Part V, infra.
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tute the determination of a happiness measure, and the balancing 
maneuver just mentioned very well might implicitly amount to the 
determination of a happiness measure), but I will leave these fur-
ther questions aside here.
In sum, even in cases of non-economic harms, despite it perhaps 
seeming as though we might need to articulate an account of hap-
piness (and perhaps even an account of happiness that is precise in 
the ways discussed in the previous Sections), it turns out that we 
can avoid these questions. The only way in which cases of non-
economic harms differ from cases of economic harms is that they 
require us to determine what the financial equivalent is, for an ag-
grieved party, of the non-economic loss in the case. This may not 
be an easy determination to make, but it nevertheless does not 
confront any of the further questions associated with happiness 
quantification.
E. Summary
The law employs the notion of returning a person back to the 
“position that he was in” or “the level that he was at,” but I have ar-
gued that these terms are vague, under-described, and lacking con-
tent. Despite these notions not having specific meanings, however, 
it seems that courts are still able to do just fine as is. They are seem-
ingly able to successfully bring it about that parties are brought 
back to the “position that he was in” or “the level that he was at.”
How is it that the courts are able to pull off this magic trick and 
bring it about that parties are brought back to the “position that he 
was in” while avoiding the underlying questions of how to articu-
late a coherent account of these notions? As the above discussion 
has shown, the law seemingly can avoid these underlying questions 
because the choice of which more precise theory to offer does not 
seem to have a bearing on the result in most cases. In other words, 
all the more precise theories seemingly would prescribe the same 
result in most cases, and thus it does not seem to matter which of 
the more precise theories we espouse.39
39. Although I will argue later in this Section and in the remainder of the Article that 
we (i.e., the law) cannot, after all, avoid answering all of the questions about how to precisify 
our account of happiness and of the “the level that a person was at,” at this point I am argu-
ing that it certainly seems prima facie (and even after giving the topics here some thought) 
that we can avoid answering the questions about how to precisify our accounts, and this 
seemingly is because all of the more precise accounts we might have seemingly would not 
affect any prescriptions. They would yield the same results in all situations, and thus, there’s
a sense in which it seems as though the differences between the various possible more pre-
cise accounts are smoothed over, like with a blanket of snow, obscuring and removing all 
differences that existed between the various sub-accounts and thus removing any need to 
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Despite these findings, however, the underlying questions re-
main, and three types of thoughts come to mind regarding them. 
First, a theoretical account of the underlying questions is valuable 
and interesting in itself. How do we measure and quantify happi-
ness—in the moment and over time? Second, could it really be that 
the law can adequately return someone to the “level that they were 
at” prior to a harm, without knowing either the magnitude or the 
choose which precise account to espouse. It seems that money is smoothing over any differ-
ences between happiness theories (i.e., differences with respect to how to quantify the hap-
piness of a moment, and also differences regarding temporal questions, and further, it 
could even maybe seem as though money can smooth over AU and TU even in the context 
of different-numbers cases). As discussed in the suitcase example, above, it seems that one 
can simply figure out how much money to give a plaintiff and that by focusing on money in 
this way we can smooth over the happiness questions.
One might think at this point, though, that there indeed is a context, similar to those 
that I’ve been discussing, that might avoid this smoothing over, and this context is the con-
text of gains (i.e., benefits), as opposed to losses (i.e., harms). Or, to put it this into the cat-
egory of a private law topic, this is the context of unjust enrichment. It might seem that the 
context of returning a person back down to the level he was at rather than returning a person 
back up to the level he was at would avoid the smoothing effect. It might seem as though the 
gain to a person’s happiness due to, say, hearing a free violin concert in the subway, is some-
thing that, unlike a harm, would have to be quantified in an amount of happiness that was 
gained and we thus could not sidestep the question of how to quantify happiness—whereas 
a harm (of, say, having one’s car stolen) would be able to sidestep the happiness by just em-
ploying money values.
Although it might seem as though the context of gains (and unjust enrichment) might 
be relevantly different from the context of harms and might thus require us to confront the 
happiness questions, this is not the case. The mistake was to compare a case of non-
economic gains to a case of economic losses. Both gains and losses, when appropriately 
compared, are the same for the purposes of this discussion. Both gains and losses can be in 
economic values or in non-economic values. Cases of economic gains and losses allow the 
same smoothing over as each other (and as discussed in the first illustration of the suitcase 
example). So too, cases of non-economic gains and losses allow the same smoothing over as 
each other, and, as discussed in the second illustration of the suitcase example, non-
economic cases involve smoothing over of the happiness questions just as the economic cas-
es do. The difference is that in the economic cases we just give the amount of money lost 
back, whereas in the non-economic cases we have to put on one side of a balance the happi-
ness or unhappiness that was caused by the event, and on the other side, an amount of 
money to be given or taken (depending on whether it’s a gain or loss) that will cause happi-
ness or unhappiness that balances the scale. As discussed in the second instance of the suit-
case example, though, non-economic cases still allow us to sidestep the happiness questions, 
because we do not need to do anything to quantify the happiness in any way. Instead, what 
we do is simply put the happiness or unhappiness on a balance to see what amount of mon-
ey it seems to be equivalent to.
Importantly, however, all of the above analysis applies just as much to the context of 
gains (or benefits) as it does to losses (or harms). Thus, even if it might have seemed as 
though the context of gains would force us to confront questions about happiness that we 
could sidestep in the context of losses, this is a mistake. We seemingly can still sidestep these 
questions in both contexts.
Although I conclude here that the context of gains is not an area that prevents us from 
sidestepping all of the happiness questions, and it thus seems that we still might be able to 
sidestep them all, as I explain later in this Section and throughout the remainder of the Ar-
ticle as a whole, it turns out that there indeed is a context that prevents us from being able 
to sidestep all of the questions. It’s just that this context is not the context floated in this 
footnote (i.e., gains)—though, the context I will say does prevent us from sidestepping all of 
the questions could apply in the context of gains, just as it could in the context of losses.
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harm or the “level they were at” prior to that harm? After all, it is an 
understatement to say that the conjunction of the following claims 
is a bit mysterious: (1) in providing remedies, we seek to bring a 
person back to the happiness level that he was at before the harm 
was incurred, yet (2) we are unable to articulate or quantify what 
happiness level a person was at before the harm was incurred, and 
(3) we are unable to articulate or quantify how much happiness a 
person lost due to the harm incurred. Third, it seems that even if 
the law could avoid answering these questions in most cases, per-
haps there could be cases where it must confront them.
As I will now show, there indeed is an important set of cases 
where the law indeed must confront these theoretical questions.
Three underlying imprecisions about the notion of “the level of 
happiness that one is at” have so far been identified: (1) impreci-
sion regarding quantifying happiness at a particular moment, (2) 
imprecision regarding the temporal component of quantifying 
happiness, and (3) imprecision regarding which aggregation 
mechanism to employ for quantifying the happiness of a period of 
time composed of component moments (if the time-period in 
question is composed of more than just a single moment). Going 
forward, I proceed as follows with respect to these three questions.
I assume that the answer to the temporal question (imprecision 
number two) is that what we care about is the level of happiness in 
a person’s future. I will in Part V, scale back this assumption and 
probe the temporal question further. Until then, though, I will as-
sume that the answer to the temporal question is that what we care 
about is the happiness level of a person’s future.
Part III addresses imprecision number one (which is about 
quantifying happiness at a particular moment). It concludes that, 
even after a substantive exploration of the topic (i.e., even after an 
exploration that is more in-depth than the brief introduction in 
Part II), the law seemingly can avoid this question. This is because 
(a) a metric for quantifying happiness at a moment can be articu-
lated, and (b) all metrics seemingly provide the same prescriptions.
This question about whether the law can avoid imprecision num-
ber one does get revisited in Part V in a circumscribed discussion, 
but Part III constitutes my general conclusion on the matter.
Part IV then addresses imprecision number three (regarding 
aggregation mechanisms). I conclude that law cannot avoid answer-
ing this question, because there are cases where our choice of aggre-
gation mechanism will affect our prescriptions. This conclusion then 
paves the way for the analysis in the later Parts in this Article.
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III. WHY WE DO NOT NEED TO SETTLE ON A PRECISE METRIC FOR 
QUANTIFYING HAPPINESS AT A PARTICULAR MOMENT: I.E.,
WHY OUR CHOICE OF A METRIC DOES NOT AFFECT 
OUR PRESCRIPTIONS IN THE LAW
Here in Part III, I address the question of how to quantify the 
happiness level at a particular moment. More specifically, I address 
whether the law can in fact avoid addressing this question, as it 
seemed in Part II that the law might. It turns out that the law can
avoid this question. This is because: (1) despite the fact that we as a 
society do not have a commonly used metric for quantifying the 
happiness of a moment of experience, this does not pose a prob-
lem for the law because we can in fact articulate a metric to quanti-
fy the happiness of a moment of experience, and (2) not only does 
the lack of a metric not pose a problem for the law, but it turns out 
that we do not need to articulate any specific metric, because it 
doesn’t matter for the purpose of any prescriptions or assessments 
which metric we adopt. The results would be the same regardless 
of which metric we choose to employ.
Thus, for these reasons, the law can avoid addressing the ques-
tion of how to quantify happiness at a particular moment.
A. Articulating a Metric (i.e., Unit) for Measuring Happiness Can Be 
Done and It Is Not Importantly Different from Articulating a Metric for 
Physical Properties Like Length and Mass
While it might initially seem different, the task of defining a 
metric (i.e., a unit) for quantifying the happiness level of a particu-
lar moment is in many ways the same as the task of defining a met-
ric for quantifying any other property, such as mass or length. In 
each of these cases, the initial choice of a unit to be used to meas-
ure the property is arbitrary.
Supposing, for example, that the “foot” was the first unit of 
length, if one were to ask how long a “foot” was, one could do 
nothing other than point to the physical object (perhaps King 
George’s left foot) that was used as the benchmark for this quanti-
ty. This choice of the length of the unit (and the name of the unit) 
would be arbitrary, and all other quantities of length would be 
made in terms of relativistic statements making comparisons to this 
unit (for example, a mile is equal to 5,280 feet).
This is precisely the same type of endeavor that could be used to 
define a unit of happiness. For example, I could have a sip of juice 
and then define the happiness of this sip of juice (and perhaps the 
“typical sip of juice”) as the unit for happiness—namely what I am 
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experiencing when I have this “typical sip of juice.” Just as with the 
unit for length, the unit for happiness is arbitrary. And just as is the 
case with length, one can then make comparisons between quanti-
ties of the property (be it lengths or be it happiness) and introduce 
new units in statements relative to the arbitrary unit. For example, 
one could say that the steak meal one had was “equal to seven ‘sips 
of typical juice.’” One could even then define a unit called “the 
typical steak meal” as being equal to seven “sips of typical juice.”
Of course, there are important ways in which defining a unit of 
happiness (as, for example, a “typical sip of juice”) is different 
from defining a unit of length (as, for example, a foot). One such 
difference relates to the observability of the quantities in question, 
and the other (related) difference relates to how assessments com-
paring relative quantities are made, and I’ll mention both in turn.
The difference relating to observability of the quantities in ques-
tion has two components, an interpersonal one and an in-
trapersonal one.
With assessments of length, a person can easily demonstrate the 
length of something to someone else by visually showing how the 
length of the object compares to the length of a benchmark. For 
example, one can place a ruler next to a piece of paper to show 
that the length of one of the sides is eleven inches. This enables 
another person to observe that the side is eleven inches. Not all 
measurements of length would be as simply demonstrated as this, 
but demonstrations of length are similar in how they can be ob-
served by a second person. If, on the other hand, I say that the ex-
perience I just had was “eleven typical sips of juice” of happiness, 
there does not seem to be any analogous way for someone other 
than myself to observe or verify this.
Further, this difference between measurements of happiness 
and of length does not only apply to the gap between one person 
and another person—it also applies to the gap within a single per-
son, between the person at one time and the same person at a later 
time. If a person, in year one, measures a table and determines 
that it is nine feet long, this same person can observe again in year 
two the determination that was made in year one. If, however, a 
person makes a happiness measurement of his experience of a par-
ticular meal on an evening in year one, there does not seem to be a 
way that even this same person can re-observe this assessment in 
year two. The person in year two may of course remember the ex-
perience that he had had in year one, but this would not constitute 
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a direct observation of the experience in year one.40 Thus, not only 
are there differences between the observation of measurements of 
length and of happiness in an interpersonal context, but there also 
are differences between measurements of length and of happiness 
in an intrapersonal context.
There is another way in which measurements of length and 
measurements of happiness are different, and it relates to the ways 
(discussed in the foregoing paragraphs) in which there are differ-
ences in the context of observability. This additional difference 
concerns how assessments comparing relative quantities are made. 
In the context of length, suppose that we have already defined the 
basic unit as the “foot.” We can then determine that something is 
three feet long if it is equal in length to an object that consists of 
three one-foot-long objects that are placed one after each other 
length-wise with the objects flush against each other. Thus, with 
length, we can determine how many feet long an object is by essen-
tially stacking objects of shorter lengths together and adding up 
the lengths of the shorter objects to determine the length of the 
longer object. In the context of happiness, however, while perhaps 
this can be done, it is much less clear how this works. Certainly,
there is no physical placing of one experience spatially next to an-
other. Perhaps the experiences are somehow hypothetically super-
imposed. How this is done is an interesting question and it is far 
from clear. This is not to say that it cannot be done in the happi-
ness context, though. Surely it can be done, and surely it is done 
all the time. After all, we engage in practical reasoning and deci-
sion making all the time that show that we can weigh the relative 
goodness of experiences. We at the very least can see this from re-
vealed preference, but there is also no reason to think that we can-
not also make the comparisons about happiness experiences them-
selves. It is clear that we do make these comparative assessments. 
How exactly these comparative assessments are made, though, is 
not completely clear, and it seems that even if we use a mechanism 
that bears analogies to the mechanism in the context of length, it 
will be a mechanism that is quite different.
Despite the clear differences between the measurement of 
length and the possible measurement of happiness, there are also 
key similarities. Importantly for our purposes, there is no reason to 
think that we cannot articulate a metric for quantifying happiness 
or that happiness cannot be quantified. Although properties like 
length and happiness have key differences, they still are similar in 
40. Many interesting questions arise in the context of intrapersonal comparisons and of 
memory of past experiences, but these are beyond the scope of this Article, so I will leave 
them aside here.
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that a similar approach can be used to provide a metric for quanti-
fying them.
Despite the fact that there is no theoretical difficulty with articu-
lating a metric for quantifying happiness, this does not mean that 
there are no challenges practically. Various difficulties exist in ex-
plaining or showing, even to oneself, what one “sip of typical juice”
of happiness is, and this provides us with difficulties not only with 
conveying to oneself or others how much happiness an experience 
had, but it also makes it particularly difficult to attempt to make as-
sessments of the quantities of happiness being experienced by oth-
er people—whose conscious experience we do not and never did 
have access to. Despite these being difficulties, however, these dif-
ficulties are mere practical difficulties. They, at least at the time be-
ing,41 might make the unit of happiness one that is not as useful as 
we might like, but these difficulties do not make it the case that we 
are unable to define a unit of happiness.42 While we do not cur-
rently in our society43 have any single commonly used or well-
established metric for quantifying happiness at a particular mo-
ment (as we do in fact have for properties like length), there is no 
theoretical reason why we cannot create and develop a single 
commonly used and well-established metric. The obstacles are only 
practical.44
41. It seems quite likely that our (practical) ability to quantify happiness will drastically 
improve with technological developments in the years to come.
42. Interesting further questions abound, but the current discussion will have to suffice 
for the purposes of this Article.
43. Although the United States does not have a single commonly used or well-
established metric for quantifying happiness, some other countries do employ metrics for 
quantifying happiness. Consider, for example, Bhutan. Bhutan employs a notion called 
“gross national happiness,” instead of the economic indicator “gross national product,” and 
the details of how the “gross national happiness” metric works are readily accessible online. 
See GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS COMMISSION, https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2020). Bhutan’s system does not purport to quantify happiness at a particular moment, 
and in that sense it differs from the type of metrics I am discussing in this Article. Notwith-
standing this difference, however, Bhutan’s system is still a metric for quantifying happiness. 
Further, we could extrapolate from Bhutan’s system to articulate a version of that system 
that does boil down to a metric that quantifies happiness at particular moments.
44. Some people might disagree with me on this point. For example, some are of the 
view that not all experiences necessarily are commensurable in terms of their goodness level 
or happiness level. For example, some might think that the experience of listening to Bach 
is different in kind and not just in magnitude from the experience of having a sip of juice, 
and thus there is no single happiness scale by which we can measure experiences. Many phi-
losophers, including John Stuart Mill and James Griffin, have espoused positions of this sort. 
See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL (J. B. 
Schneewind & Dale E. Miller eds., 2002), JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). In my view, how-
ever, even if certain experiences might appear, prima facie, to be incommensurable in terms 
of goodness or happiness, they can indeed still be compared and a single scale can indeed 
be implemented. In my view, we can infer commensurability and a single scale by appealing 
to revealed preference—observing people’s choices when confronted with choices among 
the allegedly incommensurable experiences.
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B. We Need Not Articulate a Metric for Quantifying Happiness of a 
Moment, Because Regardless of What Metric We Choose, 
Our Prescriptions Will Not Be Affected
Not only was it a key a point that we can in fact articulate a met-
ric for measuring the happiness of a particular moment, but there 
is a second key point.
What matters for our purposes is simply that a metric can be ar-
ticulated. We do not need to actually articulate any particular met-
ric for happiness. The reason for this is that, regardless of what the
metric is, we seemingly45 will have the same prescriptions. The pre-
scriptions will be the same both for questions related to quantify-
ing the happiness in a particular moment and for questions related 
to quantifying happiness in a period of a person’s life that is com-
posed of component moments. Therefore, and importantly for our 
purposes, the prescriptions will be the same for questions ad-
dressed in private law remedies, and the choice of which metric to 
use will not affect prescriptions in any direction. It does not matter 
what the unit is that is used for happiness in a given moment.
The reason for why the choice of unit does not matter—and for 
why only the fact that a unit can be articulated is what matters for 
these questions—can be seen by exploring a property such as 
length. Our reason for why we need not articulate a unit and for 
why it is only important that a unit can be articulated is the same as 
the reason that in doing an analysis about the concept of length, it 
does not matter whether the basic unit is the meter or the foot. 
Questions in, say physics, can be addressed with either system of 
measurement. What matters is simply that there exists a system of 
measurement that is coherent.
For the concept of happiness, the fact that a metric can be artic-
ulated means that there is a system of measurement that is coher-
ent. In fact, the metric employing “a typical sip of juice” and “a typ-
ical steak dinner,” which I articulated above, would itself suffice as 
a coherent metric. We need not develop any metric further than 
this, because regardless of which metric we articulate, it will not af-
fect any of our prescriptions, and this is for the same reasons as the 
fact that the laws of physics work equally well regardless of whether 
we use feet or meters as our basic unit of length.
45. I will address below, in Part V (in a discussion of the existence or non-existence of 
“zero points” and what the implications of this question are for the plausibility of AU-type 
and TU-type aggregation), why it is not quite the case that we can leave this question aside. 
Despite that (fairly circumscribed) discussion, however, my conclusion here in Part III (that 
different choices of metrics for quantifying happiness in a moment do not affect our pre-
scriptions) does constitute my general conclusion on the topic.
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C. Summary
Despite the fact that we as a society do not have a commonly 
used metric for quantifying the happiness of a moment of experi-
ence, it turns out that this does not pose a problem for private law 
remedies and the goal of bringing a person back to “the happiness 
level that he was at.” As I’ve shown, we can in fact articulate a met-
ric to quantify happiness, and the way in which we could do so is 
very similar to the way in which we articulate metrics for physical 
properties such as length and mass.
Not only does the current lack of a metric not pose a problem 
for private law remedies, but it turns out that we do not need to ar-
ticulate any specific metric for quantifying the happiness of a mo-
ment. This is because, as with the case of length, it doesn’t matter 
for the purpose of any prescriptions or assessments which metric 
one adopts. The results will be the same regardless of which metric 
we choose to employ.
For the foregoing reasons, I will now leave aside the question of 
how to quantify the amount of happiness in a particular moment. I 
will simply assume not only that we can articulate a metric for 
quantifying happiness at a particular moment, but that we in fact 
already have such a metric that is commonly used, and that we can 
employ this metric to determine how much happiness exists at a 
particular moment of a person’s conscious experience.
In Part V, I will briefly scale back this assumption and probe fur-
ther some questions related to how we quantify happiness of a par-
ticular moment, but, leaving aside the purposes in that specific 
Part, I will assume throughout the remainder of this Article that we 
need not further probe or question how we can or do quantify the 
happiness of a particular moment.
IV. WHY WE DO NEED TO BE MORE PRECISE IN ARTICULATING AN 
AGGREGATION MECHANISM: I.E., WHY THE CHOICE OF AGGREGATION 
MECHANISM CAN AFFECT THE LAW’S PRESCRIPTIONS
A. Introduction
Two of the three imprecisions of the phrase “the happiness level 
that one is at” have now been addressed and resolved. I already de-
termined46 (preliminarily at least) that “the happiness level that 
46. See supra Part II.
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one is at” refers to the happiness level of one’s future (as opposed 
to the happiness level at a single particular moment, for one’s
whole life, or for some other temporal (or non-temporal) group-
ing of moments in a person’s life). I have now also addressed47 the 
question of articulating a metric for quantifying the happiness at a 
particular moment, and I have argued that we can leave this ques-
tion aside and proceed as though we not only can articulate such a 
metric, but that we in fact already have such a metric that is com-
monly used.
I thus can now address the most important topic of this Article: 
the question of what our aggregation mechanism should be—i.e.,
what function we should use to derive the happiness value of a por-
tion of a person’s life, given (and taking as inputs) particular hap-
piness values of each of the component moments in this time peri-
od.
In Part II, above, I argued that it seemed as though the law’s
failure to choose an aggregation mechanism for determining the 
happiness level of a person’s future doesn’t affect or interfere with 
the law’s ability to provide a person with a future of the level it 
would have been if not for a harm incurred. It seemed as though 
we could avoid determining what the happiness level of a person’s
future would have been if not for the harm and what the happiness 
level of a person’s future would be after the harm if there were no 
remedy. Similarly (and relatedly), it seemed that we could avoid 
determining how much happiness the person lost as a result of the 
harm.
It turns out, however, that it only seemed that we could avoid 
answering the question of which aggregation mechanism to 
choose. It turns out that there are situations where we will need to 
answer this question. Although it seemed as though the choice of 
aggregation mechanism would not affect our prescriptions in any 
cases, it turns out that there are some cases where the choice of 
aggregation mechanism will affect our prescriptions. Because of 
this, we are unable to avoid answering the question of which ag-
gregation mechanism is most plausible. This Part shows why this is 
the case.
I begin by (re-)introducing “different-numbers problems,” and I 
explain that it is these types of cases, if we in fact confront them in 
the law, that would require us to choose which aggregation mech-
anism is most plausible. I then explain how private law remedies 
could confront and in fact do confront different-numbers cases. As 
I explain, the situations where private law remedies confront dif-
47. See supra Part III.
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ferent-numbers cases are cases where a person incurs a harm that 
results in the person’s life being shortened (and this shortening of 
a person’s life could be brought about either by an immediate 
death or by a death, which, though non-immediate, nevertheless 
will result in a person’s life being shorter than it otherwise would 
have been).
B. Types of Cases Where We Will Have to Probe Further: “Different-
Numbers Cases” (as Distinguished from “Same-Numbers Cases”)—and 
Why They Are Tricky
1. “Different-Numbers Cases”
The types of situations that require us to choose which aggrega-
tion method to espouse are cases that I will call “different-numbers 
cases,” and these are to be distinguished from what I will call 
“same-numbers cases.” Both different-numbers cases and same-
numbers cases have the following features. Both cases are cases 
where we are comparing two (or more than two, but for simplici-
ty’s sake, I’ll focus on two) possible states of affairs, both of which 
contain a number of parts (or “components”), and in both of 
which the goodness or value of each of the whole states of affairs is 
a function of the goodness or value of each of the components that 
exists in that state of affairs. These types of cases can arise in vari-
ous contexts where the components are various different types of 
things, but the two main types are (1) cases where a component is 
a person’s life and where the whole is, say, a world, and (2) cases 
where a component is a single conscious moment that a person 
experiences and where the whole is, say, a person’s whole life.48
Further, to keep things simple, I’ll focus in particular on the sec-
ond of these two types of cases—cases where the components in 
question are single conscious moments of a person. Thus, in the 
cases that I’m considering, we’re comparing the goodness of two 
states of affairs, and each state of affairs is made up of nothing oth-
48. Although these two examples involve a world (the whole) that is made up of people 
(the components) and a person (the whole) that is made up of conscious moments (the 
components), all sorts of other possible same-numbers and different-numbers cases exist. 
For example, to name just a few other types of data that could give rise to different-numbers 
and same-numbers cases: They could involve things such as wins and games played for a 
sports team, or shots made and shots taken by a player in basketball, or numbers of pieces 
one has in a game of checkers and whether the pieces are kings or not. In this Article, how-
ever, I will focus on cases where the whole is a person’s life (or a portion thereof), and 
where the components are his moments of conscious experience.
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er than conscious moments experienced by a person.49 Further, the 
goodness or value (here, happiness level) of a whole state of affairs 
is a function of the goodness or value (here, happiness level) of its 
components. The foregoing features are what same-numbers cases 
and different-numbers cases have in common.
The way in which same-numbers cases and different-numbers 
cases differ is (perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the names I’ve 
given them) that in same-numbers cases, the numbers of compo-
nents in the two states of affairs being compared are the same, 
whereas in different-numbers cases, the numbers of components in 
the two states of affairs being compared are different.
Taking as our two basic aggregation methods the two aggrega-
tion methods that I introduced in Part II, TU-type aggregation and 
AU-type aggregation, we can now see that while same-numbers cas-
es will not require us to choose between these two methods, the 
different-numbers cases will require us to do so.
Let’s first consider a same-numbers case. Take, for example, a 
case where a state of affairs, call it s1, is made up of a person 
named Bill’s future. Suppose that s1 involves ten conscious mo-
ments. Each conscious moment is at a happiness level of seven. 
Suppose that a different state of affairs, s2, is a different possible 
future that might be in store for Bill. It also involves ten conscious 
moments, but due to a harm that befell Bill, all of the conscious 
moments in s2 are at a happiness level of five. In assessing the 
happiness levels (or levels of goodness or value) of s1 and s2, and 
in assessing whether s1 or s2 is the state of affairs with a higher 
happiness level (or a higher level of goodness or value), we need 
not choose between AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggregation. 
According to both aggregation methods, the happiness level of s1 
is higher than that of s2, and by the same ratio: According to AU-
type aggregation, the happiness level of s1 is 7 and the happiness 
level of s2 is 5, and according to TU-type aggregation, the happi-
ness level of s1 is 70 and the happiness level of s2 is 50. Further, in 
same-numbers cases, it will always be the case that AU-type aggre-
gation and TU-type aggregation provide the same determination 
of which state of affairs is better and provide the same ratio by 
which this is the case. The reason for this is simple: the AU-type 
aggregation value for a state of affairs is equal to the total number 
of units divided by the number of components, and since the same 
number of components exist in both states of affairs in a same-
numbers case, the AU-type aggregation value for each state of af-
49. Or, more specifically, the two states of affairs are made up of nothing that’s relevant 
for our inquiry other than conscious moments experienced by a person. I’m not denying that 
other things exist in this state of affairs, such as trees, air, buildings, etc.
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fairs will be arrived at by taking the TU-type aggregation sum in 
each case and dividing it by the same number in each case. Thus, if 
a TU-type happiness level number for s1 is higher than a TU-type 
happiness level number for s2, and by a ratio of, say, seven to five, 
dividing the TU-type happiness level numbers for s1 and s2 by the 
same number50 preserves both the fact that the s1 number is bigger 
than the s2 number, and the ratio by which this is so. In light of 
this, in same-numbers cases, we need not make a choice between 
espousing a TU-type aggregation mechanism or an AU-type aggre-
gation mechanism.
In different-numbers cases, however, we generally do have to 
choose between espousing TU-type aggregation and AU-type ag-
gregation, and this is because the two aggregation methods do not 
always provide the same assessments of states of affairs. Take, for 
example, two possible futures for Bill. In s3, which is identical to s1 
(above), Bill’s future includes ten conscious moments, each of 
which is at a happiness level of seven. In s4, however, there are
fewer moments in Bill’s future, because Bill dies sooner. In s4, 
however, Bill has a higher level of happiness in the moments that 
he does have. In s4, there are only five conscious moments, but 
each one is at a happiness level of ten. Given these two possible 
states of affairs, which one has a higher happiness level (or, stated 
slightly differently, which state of affairs has more happiness? Or, 
stated in another way, which of these two states of affairs is better?) 
One’s answer to this question will depend, crucially, on whether 
one espouses TU-type aggregation or AU-type aggregation, be-
cause they will not say the same thing. According to TU-type ag-
gregation, the happiness level of s3 is 70, and the happiness level 
of s4 is 50. According to AU-type aggregation, however, the happi-
ness level of s3 is 7, and the happiness level of s4 is 10. Thus, TU-
type aggregation says that s3 has a higher happiness level than s4, 
but AU-type aggregation says that s4 has a higher happiness level 
than s3. While in this case TU-type aggregation and AU-type ag-
gregation have differing assessments of which state of affairs has a 
higher happiness level, this is not always the case. Even in many 
cases where they do not have differing assessments of which state 
of affairs has a higher happiness level, though, they still may pro-
vide different assessments, because even if both say that one state 
of affairs is the better one, one of the mechanisms might say that 
the happier state of affairs only has slightly more happiness,
50. This holds true because the number of components will always be a positive num-
ber. Also, though the following feature is not required for the statements in question to 
hold true, it’s worth noting that the number of components will also always be a whole 
number.
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whereas the other mechanism might say that the gap in happiness 
level between the two states of affairs is huge.
These examples illustrate that different-numbers cases require 
us to choose between TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggrega-
tion. It’s important to note, though, that these different numbers-
cases need not be comparisons between states of affairs where the 
components are conscious moments of a person’s life. Instead, 
perhaps, the numbers in the examples above could be applied to 
an example where the numbers represent years of life in one’s fu-
ture (which, of course, could also be considered to be shorthand 
for, say, one billion conscious moments). Further, leaving aside the 
context where a state of affairs consists of one life, similar examples 
can be provided where the state of affairs consists in the whole 
population and where the components (of which there are differ-
ent numbers in the two states of affairs) are the people alive in 
each possible population. Similarly, in different-numbers cases in 
these contexts, we need to choose between AU-type aggregation 
and TU-aggregation.
2. Why “Different-Numbers Cases” Are Tricky
The choice about which aggregation mechanism to espouse is 
not an easy one to make, and this is because all possible views are 
seemingly afflicted by devastating counterintuitive implications. I 
address the question of which aggregation mechanism to espouse 
in much greater depth elsewhere,51 but I here provide a brief pre-
view of some of the seemingly devastating counterintuitive implica-
tions that appear to render TU-type aggregation and AU-type ag-
gregation implausible (despite their otherwise attractive features). 
Consider the following points that show some of the main difficul-
ties that afflict TU-type and AU-type aggregation. First, as to TU-
type aggregation.
Despite the prima facie plausibility of TU-type aggregation, it 
seems as though there are some considerations that cast doubt on 
51. See Pressman, supra, note 9; see also Michael Pressman, A Defense of Average Utilitarian-
ism, 27 UTILITAS 389 (2015); see generally Gustaf Arrhenius, An Impossibility Theorem in Popula-
tion Axiology with Weak Ordering Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL CRUMBS. ESSAYS DEDICATED 
TO ANN-MARI HENSCHEN-DAHLQUIST ON THE OCCASION OF HER SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY 11 
(Rysiek Sliwinski ed., 1999); GUSTAF ARRHENIUS, FUTURE GENERATIONS: A CHALLENGE FOR 
MORAL THEORY (2011); Gustaf Arrhenius, The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics, in 
3 DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1 (H. Colonius & E. 
Dzhafarov eds., 2011); JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES (2004); Parfit, supra note 13; LARRY S.
TEMKIN, RETHINKING THE GOOD (2012); Thomas Hurka, Value and Population Size, 93 ETHICS
496 (1983); Jeff McMahan, Problems of Population Theory, 92 ETHICS 96 (1981).
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the plausibility of TU-type aggregation. Consider the following two 
(similar) thought experiments.
First, consider the “The Single-Life Repugnant Conclusion.” If 
TU-type aggregation is the correct measure for assessing the good-
ness of a life, then the following is an implication of this view: for 
any life of however many moments, each of fantastically high hap-
piness level, there is a better possible life that exists that is com-
posed only of moments (as long as there are enough of them) of a 
positive value, where that value is so infinitesimally small that a 
person is almost indifferent to being alive. At every moment, this 
person would be just the slightest notch above the happiness level 
at which one would prefer to not be alive. Nevertheless, TU-type 
aggregation implies that this would will be better than the shorter 
life wherein every moment is fantastically happy, because if there 
are enough moments of the positive yet tiny value, they will out-
weigh the number of units of happiness in the shorter life, despite 
all the moments in the shorter life being of a fantastically high 
happiness level. This conclusion is thought to be repugnant, 
though, and thus the fact that this is an implication of TU-type ag-
gregation provides some reason to think that TU-type aggregation 
cannot be correct.52 It elicits the intuitions that there is at least 
some importance of and relevance of the happiness level that one 
experiences at the different moments of one’s life and that every-
thing does not boil down to the total number of units of happiness 
experienced.
While this thought experiment was couched in fairly abstract 
terms and also in terms of a person whose moments of experience 
are at such a low level that they are just a notch above the level at 
which the person would prefer not to be alive, I can offer an addi-
tional thought experiment that elicits the same intuitions, but 
which is slightly more applied and which does not necessarily em-
ploy a person being quite so close to the level where he would pre-
fer to not be alive. This thought experiment, Haydn and the Oys-
ter, asks: would one prefer to have the life of the composer Haydn, 
who lives a good life and dies at the age of 75, or would one prefer 
to live a two-thousand-year life as an oyster?53 This thought experi-
ment, like the Intra-life Repugnant Conclusion, is meant to elicit 
the intuitions that TU-type aggregation cannot be correct, and that 
there is at least some importance of and relevance of the happiness 
level that one experiences at different moments of one’s life and 
52. See TEMKIN, supra note 51, at 119.
53. This thought experiment originated with Roger Crisp. See ROGER CRISP, MILL ON
UTILITARIANISM (1997).
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that everything does not boil down to the total number of units of 
happiness experienced.
Second, as to AU-type aggregation.
Despite there being reasons to support AU-type aggregation, 
there are also reasons to find that AU-type aggregation is not plau-
sible.
The main problem with AU-type aggregation is that, while it 
seemingly gets the right answer in the case of the single-life repug-
nant conclusion and Haydn and the oyster, it is susceptible to a 
similar argument that shows that the implications of espousing AU-
type aggregation are quite unpalatable. According to AU-type ag-
gregation, the goodness of a life is determined by the average hap-
piness of the moments in the life, and it does not matter how long 
or short a life is. This means that given, say, a life that is 80 years 
long and where each moment is at level 8, each of the following 
lives, which is made up of moments of happiness level 8.01, is a 
better life than the one that is 80 years long: A life of level 8.01 that 
lasts twenty-five years, a life of level 8.01 that lasts ten years, a life of 
level 8.01 that lasts one year, a life of level 8.01 that lasts for one 
day, a life of level 8.01 that lasts for one minute, or even a life of 
level 8.01 that just consists of one single conscious moment. That 
each of these lives would, according to AU-type aggregation, be 
better than the one that is at a level of 8 and lasts for 80 years, will 
for many people be highly unpalatable.
Further, another implication of AU-type aggregation is that, if 
one’s future would be of the same happiness level as one’s average 
level of happiness so far, the shortening of one’s life would not
harm a person at all. This is an implication that for many people 
will be highly unpalatable, and, in fact, it was the intuition that a 
person can be harmed by having his life shortened that gave rise to 
our whole inquiry into AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggrega-
tion. This was because it seemed as though our intuitions were at 
odds with the current policy of the courts—a policy which says that 
when a person has his life shortened, this does not harm the per-
son.
This is only the tip of the iceberg about the topic of which ag-
gregation mechanism is most plausible,54 but this should give the 
reader a sense of the difficulties that one confronts in the attempt 
to choose which aggregation mechanism is most plausible.
54. See Pressman, supra note 9.
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C. How Private Law Remedies Could Confront and 
Do Confront Different-Numbers Cases
1. How Private Law Remedies Could 
Confront Different-Numbers Cases
The question now becomes: Does the law (and private law rem-
edies in particular) ever confront different-numbers cases? The an-
swer is “yes.”
Of course, this whole domain of questions—of same-numbers 
cases and different-numbers cases alike—only arises when we’re at-
tempting to make a comparison between two possible states of af-
fairs. Thus, the first task is to determine what the possible states of 
affairs are that we’re comparing. In our context, the first state of 
affairs is the person’s “expected”55 future in the state of affairs 
where no harm is incurred. The second state of affairs is the per-
son’s “expected” future in the state of affairs where a harm is in-
curred. Thus, in comparing these two possible states of affairs, we’ll
have a same-numbers case if the two possible futures are of the 
same length, and we’ll have a different-numbers case if the two 
possible futures are of different lengths.
Typical cases that the law confronts are same-numbers cases. 
Typically, a harm that is incurred by a person (be it a financial 
harm or otherwise) does not affect the length of one’s expected 
future. Of course, every event in one’s life affects the trajectory of 
one’s future and thus even the occurrence of the most seemingly 
insignificant event can have enormous effects on what transpires in 
one’s future. Further, these effects on one’s future often will affect 
how long one lives (i.e., how long one’s future is). Despite this, 
however, these effects are usually highly unpredictable and there’s
usually no way of predicting whether a particular event will length-
en one’s life, shorten one’s life, or have no effect at all on the 
length of one’s life. In light of this, when a harm is incurred by a 
person, the “expected” effect that this harm has on the length of 
the person’s life is typically zero. Thus, the typical cases that private 
law remedies confront are same-numbers cases.
Private law remedies will confront a different-numbers problem, 
however, if the harm brings about a change to the expected length 
55. The word “expected” can refer to an estimation or guess, but it also can refer to a 
probabilistic expected value, i.e., an expectation in a more rigorously calculated sense. Alt-
hough there is overlap between these two senses of the word “expected,” here and in the 
rest of the Article I intend to refer to the second of these two senses of the word “expected”
(unless I indicate otherwise).
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of the person’s life. An event that is a harm could bring about ei-
ther an increase or a decrease in the expected length of the per-
son’s life. I’ll focus here on cases where the harm causes a decrease 
in the expected length of life, but it’s important to note that there 
could also be harms that could create a different-numbers problem 
by increasing the length of a person’s expected life. These cases 
where a harm causes an increase in length of life could either be 
due to the fact that the person is suffering and the increase in life 
length is something that is itself a harm for the person, or it could 
be due to the increase in life length being a benefit, but one which 
comes along with and which is outweighed by a harm. I will leave 
these possibilities aside, however, and focus on cases where there is 
a harm and where we get a different-numbers case because the 
harm decreases the length of a person’s life.
There is another interesting distinction to note here: among 
these cases where there is a harm and where the harm causes a de-
crease in the expected length of the person’s life, it seems that 
there are at least three categories of cases: those in which the only 
harm to the person is due to the loss in years of life (and in which 
there is no harm due to effects on the years that are still lived), 
those in which the only harm to the person is due to effects on the 
years that are still lived (and in which there is no harm due to the 
lost years), and those in which there is harm due to the lost years 
and due to the effects on the years that are still lived.
Regardless of the various ways to categorize these types of cases, 
the bottom line here is that private law remedies can indeed con-
front different-numbers cases. These are cases where a harm is in-
curred and where the harm that is incurred also affects the ex-
pected length of the person’s life. While this is in fact the bottom 
line here, we will soon see that the distinction between the cases 
above is important. I will continue to leave aside the cases where 
the harm involves an increase in the person’s expected length of 
life , but there will be important points made about the two types 
of ways in which there could be harm in the cases where there is 
harm and where the person’s expected length of life decreases—
(1) harm due to the loss in years of life, and (2) harm due to harm 
experienced during the years that are still lived.
The foregoing has showed how private law remedies can con-
front different-numbers cases. To further explore not only how 
they can do so, but also how they do so, I will now consider some 
specific factual situations that private law remedies confronts that 
involve different-numbers cases.
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2. How Private Law Remedies Do Confront Different-Numbers 
Cases: The Situations in Which a Person Is Harmed by 
Having His Life Shortened
Situations in which lives are shortened are numerous and occur 
in various forms.
As stated earlier in this Article,56 the legal system could confront 
cases of plaintiffs seeking a remedy for the harm of lost life-years in 
two contexts. First, a case might be brought after a victim has died. 
In such a case, although a remedy for the lost life-years might be 
warranted in order to bring about optimal incentives for future 
tortfeasors, it could be argued that plaintiffs should not recover for 
this harm because this harm was to the victim herself who no long-
er is alive therefore cannot be compensated. This Article, however, 
primarily explores a second context in which plaintiffs might seek 
a remedy for the harm of lost life-years: cases in which a victim has 
her expected future shortened by a tort, but in which she has not 
yet died. In a case of this type, the fact that the victim is still alive 
makes it possible to compensate the victim herself directly for the 
value of life-years. Thus, even if compensation for lost life-years is 
not warranted in cases where the victim is dead, it might still be 
warranted in cases where the victim is still alive. Thus, going for-
ward, this Article focuses primarily on situations in the latter cate-
gory—where the victim is still alive at the time of suit.
The following are some examples of situations that can result in 
lives being shortened: (1) medical malpractice, (2) torts of expo-
sure to dangerous substances, such as asbestos, smoking, or other 
carcinogens, (3) torts of accidents, such as car accidents involving 
reckless driving, or construction accidents, and also (4) intentional 
torts, including but not limited to intentional killings. Of these var-
ious examples, all can shorten lives, and some of them can also in-
volve variants where not only is a life shortened but it is brought to 
an immediate end. The foregoing are some of the main examples 
of situations in which lives can be shortened, but other examples 
exist as well.
To elaborate on one of these categories of cases, and to see how 
it might be an example of a harm that shortens a person’s life, 
consider medical malpractice. An example of a typical fact pattern 
might be the following: A doctor negligently fails to correctly diag-
nose a disease or negligently fails to call for a procedure that would 
show the existence of a disease. The patient then discovers the dis-
ease a year later, at which point the disease is at such an advanced 
56. See Introduction, supra.
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stage that nothing can be done to cure the disease, and it is esti-
mated that the patient has one year left to live. If, however, the pa-
tient had become aware of the disease a year earlier, it could have 
been easily treated and cured and the patient, based on his age, 
would have an expected remaining life length of thirty years. Thus, 
as a result of the doctor’s negligence, the patient’s expected length 
of remaining life at the time of the negligence was shortened from 
thirty-one years to two years.
Additionally, as stated above, all four of the categories men-
tioned in the non-exhaustive list could result in a shortening of life 
that is brought about by an immediate death or by a death that is 
not immediate. The example of medical malpractice happened to 
involve a non-immediate death, but a variant of that case could in-
volve immediate death. To further illustrate a possible case where 
the shortening of life is brought about by an immediate death, 
though, I offer additional examples from the third and fourth cat-
egory above. On the one hand, in the context of negligence, there 
are situations in which a person is killed immediately by another 
person’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On the other 
hand, in the context of an intentional tort, there are situations in 
which a person murders another person and where the murderer 
is the defendant in a civil case arising out of the murder. In both of 
these types of cases, as with the original example of medical mal-
practice, a person’s life has been shortened. In these two latter cas-
es, however, a person is not left with any remaining life at all.
Thus, there are various categories of cases in which a person can 
have his life shortened. Further, for all of these categories, the 
death that brings about the shortening of the person’s life can be 
an immediate one or a non-immediate one, and if it’s a non-
immediate one, the death can happen at any possible point in time 
in a person’s future—be it in the near future or be it in the distant 
future.
Before continuing, it’s important to be clear about how preva-
lent these cases of a person having his life shortened are. These 
types of cases where a person’s life is shortened certainly do not 
constitute the majority of cases where a person is harmed. Much to 
the contrary, they constitute the vast minority of cases in which a 
person is harmed. Notwithstanding this, these cases are not to be 
ignored. They are still numerous and important. Further, although 
the following point is not one that is necessary for justifying the fo-
cus on these types of cases (cases where a harm shortens a person’s
life), I will explain in Part VI of this Article that there is reason to 
believe that the prevalence of these cases is likely to grow signifi-
cantly in the future as various technologies develop. Even leaving 
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aside this conjecture, the prevalence of these cases today is still 
substantial enough to deserve our close attention, focus, and analy-
sis.
D. Summary
In sum, although in most cases we could do fine without articu-
lating which mechanism we espouse for aggregating happiness, 
there are cases in which we must be more precise and we must ar-
ticulate which aggregation mechanism we espouse. These cases 
that require us to be more precise are what I call “different-
numbers cases.” In the context of private law remedies, we could 
encounter different-numbers cases if we have a tort that harms a 
person by shortening his life. Not only can private law remedies 
theoretically encounter different-numbers problems, but private 
law remedies in fact does confront different-numbers problems 
and I have described some examples of the fact patterns in which it 
does so. Thus, it turns out that we do indeed need to be more pre-
cise; we need to be able to articulate a plausible account of which 
aggregation mechanism we should espouse for aggregating happi-
ness.
V. THE LAW’S POSITION ON SHORTENING-OF-LIFE ISSUES AND 
HOW TO ASSESS WHETHER IT IS A GOOD POSITION
This leaves a number of important questions about shortening-
of-life cases unanswered. First, can plaintiffs currently recover for 
having their lives shortened? What is the current state of the law 
with respect to such cases? Second, why might the law be the way it 
is? Third, is the current state of the law satisfactory? I explore these 
various topics in depth elsewhere.57 I do, however, provide a brief 
summary of these topics here.
A. The Law Regarding Situations in Which a Person Is Harmed by 
Having His Life Shortened: Whether Recovery Is Allowed
Although there are various claims that can arise out of a tortious 
shortening of a life, these claims typically cannot be brought until 
the harmed individual has died. Further, the vast majority of these 
claims are for the harms to the family of the decedent (both for 
57. See Pressman, supra note 9.
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economic and non-economic harms). There also can be recovery 
for the decedent’s economic and non-economic losses incurred 
before his death. There is a huge omission in the claims that can 
be brought, however: what in many cases is quite possibly the worst 
of all the harms incurred by the person is something that a legal 
claim typically cannot be brought for (both, by him, while he is 
alive and aware of the fact that his life has been shortened, and, by 
his family, after his death): the harm to the decedent of the lost 
years of life themselves.
There are, however, a few examples of cases where courts have 
allowed recovery for a claim for the harm specifically of having 
one’s life shortened. This, however, is extremely rare, and two of 
the very few examples are Alexander v. Scheid,58 an Indiana Supreme 
Court case, and Downie v. United States Lines Co.,59 a Third Circuit 
case.60 As for how these few courts calculated the amount of com-
pensation for having one’s life shortened, seemingly very little 
analysis went into the decision of how much compensation to pro-
vide. The courts simply assumed that the amount of compensation 
should be calculated by employing something functionally equiva-
lent to (what I call) TU-type aggregation, and they provided a cer-
tain amount of compensation for each year by which the person’s
life was shortened.61
Thus, in sum, although the general rule is that courts do not al-
low a person to recover compensation for having his life short-
ened, there are a (very) few courts that have provided compensa-
tion to a person for having his life shortened. Even these courts 
that have provided compensation to a person for having his life 
shortened, however, provided very little insight into both (1) why a 
party should be compensated for having his life shortened, and (2) 
given that a party should be compensated for having his life short-
ened, how to quantify the value of this harm, and how to deter-
58. Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000).
59. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966).
60. As for the state of the law regarding recovery for lost life-years in cases where the 
victim has already died, almost no states permit recovery for such losses. A small minority of 
“hedonic-loss states” (Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and New Mexico) do
allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result of his lost years 
of life. See Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242 (Ark. 2004); Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 
(Conn. 1976); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994); Marcotte v. Timber-
lane/Hampstead School District, 733 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1999); New Mexico St. § 41-2-1; Smith 
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (N.M. 2000). But, even in these states, courts do 
not always provide recovery for the hedonic loss caused by the lost years, and, where they do, 
there is no clear system for calculating these damages, and the courts’ opinions are rife with 
confusion.
61. As I will discuss in Part V, below, a measure of compensation of this sort could very 
well turn out to be a plausible (or correct, or good) measure of compensation, but this is far 
from obviously the case.
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mine how much financial compensation is the appropriate amount 
to compensate for having one’s life shortened.
B. Making Sense of the Law’s Treatment of 
(i.e., Identifying Its Position on) 
These Shortening-of-Life Issues
The law generally does not allow recovery for a claim for the 
harm to the person whose life is shortened for the lost years of life. As 
for how to make sense of the law’s treatment of these cases and
identify its position on why no recovery is permitted, the inferences 
we can make in the context of cases of immediate death are differ-
ent from those that we can make in the context of cases of non-
immediate death.
In the context of immediate death, it is unclear whether the 
failure to allow recovery for the lost years is due to practicalities of 
the situation or a theoretical position; after all, the person is dead, 
so he cannot be compensated even if we think he deserves com-
pensation. In the context of non-immediate death, however, where 
the practicalities of the situation do not prevent a person from su-
ing and recovering, it becomes clear that the inability of a person 
to recover is due to a theoretical position of the courts that a per-
son should not be able to be compensated for having his life short-
ened. Further, given that private law remedies seek to compensate 
a person for the harm he has incurred, the law seems to be telling 
us that a person is not harmed by having his life shortened (i.e., by 
losing years of life).
Various objections, rooted in practical considerations, could be 
made to this inference, however.
For instance, one might argue that the reason courts do not al-
low a person to get compensated for having his life shortened is 
not that the person is not harmed by this, but rather, that we just 
aren’t equipped to make life expectancy estimates with any confi-
dence when a person’s life expectancy might be affected by an 
event but the death is not immediate.62 While this explanation 
62. Another point that is related to this is that perhaps we do not think we are 
equipped to make estimates with any confidence about a person’s future happiness levels. 
This topic will be further discussed in Part VI. This on its own, however, does not provide a 
plausible explanation for why we might not allow a person to be compensated for having his 
life shortened. As long as we think that a person would be happy enough that he would be 
benefited by additional years of life, then an inability to accurately estimate exactly how 
happy the person would be doesn’t seem to be a reason to withhold compensation to a per-
son. Difficulty in articulating future happiness levels would more appropriately come into 
play in determining how much compensation a person should receive for having his life 
shortened, not the prior question of whether he should be compensated at all.
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might have some prima facie plausibility, it fails for two reasons. 
First, we do make life expectancy estimates all the time. These es-
timates are made both (a) in society in general, and also (b) specif-
ically by the courts, albeit in other contexts.63 Second, even if it
weren’t for the fact that we do make estimates in various type of 
cases, there are some cases that are so clear cut in terms of it being 
obvious that a person has had his life shortened, that even if we 
usually do not have confidence in our estimates about life expec-
tancy, these cases would and should constitute exceptions.
A second possible explanation for why courts might not allow 
recovery for the harm of having one’s life shortened is the follow-
ing: in order for a person to be able to bring a claim for having his 
life shortened, he will have to be alive (i.e., the harm will have to 
be due to a non-immediate death), but in the cases in which a per-
son is still alive, not only is the life expectancy estimate often diffi-
cult to make, but it also will often be difficult to know whether the 
event in question will in fact lead to future death at all. According-
ly, there is a concern about pre-emptive suing and whether a claim 
would be ripe.
Thus, the problem for some of these shortened-life claims seems 
to be that on the one hand, they’re only certain when the death 
occurs, but, on the other hand, the person can only be compen-
sated while he is still alive. Thus, it seems that a person should at 
least potentially be able to be compensated earlier on in life even if 
the death is not certain, but, on the other hand, we typically do not 
award compensation for claims that are conjectural, probabilistic, 
and not yet ripe.
This type of conundrum, it seems, might be a practical reason 
that courts have typically not allowed compensation for a person 
whose life has been shortened.64 Even this, however, could only be 
a partial explanation of the current law, because there are various 
cases that avoid these concerns by having a future death that for 
one reason or other is particularly certain, despite its being in the 
future.
Thus, it seems that to the extent that a person should be com-
pensated for a shortened life, these concerns about preemptive-
63. Life expectancy estimates are made, even in the context of wrongful death cases, 
for the purpose of determining the financial support that a spouse would have received 
from the decedent. See, e.g., In re Delmoro, 2015 NY Slip Op. 25146 [48 Misc.3d 628, 631] 
(2015).
64. I think that this might very well play at least some role in explaining the inability to 
recover for having one’s life shortened. Further, to the extent that a conclusion of this Arti-
cle is that there should be compensation for a person whose life is shortened, the considera-
tion here will be a potential obstacle, and a topic that will be relevant to consider when we 
determine the details of how to compensate a person for his having his life shortened.
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ness, speculativeness, ripeness and lack of certainty should not 
stand as a bar that prevents a person from recovering compensa-
tion for having his life shortened. Notwithstanding this, these con-
cerns are important, and I will return to discuss them in Part VI.
In sum, it seems that there are some important possible practical 
explanations for why it might be that we do not allow recovery of 
compensation for a person who has his life shortened. To the ex-
tent that one or more of these explanations (or perhaps multiple 
explanations jointly) were to explain our disallowance of recovery 
for these claims, it then would not necessarily be the case that the 
law is stating that a person is not harmed by having his life short-
ened. As I have argued above, though, it seems as though the prac-
tical explanations do not cover all cases, and thus it seems that 
even if these practical considerations are important and relevant, 
they do not fully explain our disallowance of recovery for having 
one’s life shortened. Thus, it does seem that the law likely in at 
least some cases is saying that a person is not harmed by having his 
life shortened. For this reason alone, it will be crucial to explore 
the question of whether the law is right about this: is it the case 
that a person in fact is not harmed by having his life shortened?
The various foregoing points justify my inquiry (in Part V) into 
whether a person is harmed by having his life shortened. However, 
in light of the fact that I’ve stated that the practical considerations 
do not fully cover all cases and thus do not fully explain our disal-
lowance of recovery, I will assume throughout the rest of this Arti-
cle that the law currently is stating that a person is not harmed by 
having his life shortened.65
C. Next Steps: How to Assess Whether the Law’s Position on 
Shortening-of-Life Issues Is a Good One
The question now is what we should make of the fact that the 
law says that a person is not harmed by having his life shortened. 
Prima facie, it seems that this is a mistake. After all, most people 
would view the shortening of one’s life—be it via an immediate 
death or by a death that is further into the future—to be among 
the most severe harms that one could possibly incur.
65. It may or may not be the case that the law is stating this, but (1) given the consider-
ations that I have discussed, see discussion here in Part V.B, it is not an unreasonable as-
sumption, and (2) not much hangs on the assumption. Not much hangs on the assumption 
because even if it is not true, the inquiries in this Article will be just as important as if the 
assumption were correct.
654 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:3
Thus, the next step is to turn to the question of whether a per-
son is harmed by having his life shortened, and, if so, how much of 
a harm this is. The answers to these questions will be a function of 
which aggregation mechanism we espouse, which in turn will be a 
function of which aggregation mechanism is the most plausible.
Although providing an answer to these questions is a time-
consuming and arduous task that is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, this Section sketches out how I address this task elsewhere.66
Here, I consider briefly (1) which aggregation mechanism is the 
most plausible, and (2) how we can convert our answers to the 
happiness questions into a measure of compensation for the ag-
grieved person.
1. Determining Which Aggregation Mechanism Is the 
Most Plausible
We can determine whether a person is harmed by having his life 
shortened by choosing which aggregation mechanism we think is 
most plausible for determining the value of a temporal portion of a 
person’s life. The choice of aggregation mechanism enables us to 
do this, because it enables us to aggregate and quantify the happi-
ness that the life would have contained if not for it having been 
shortened, and also to aggregate and quantify the happiness that 
the life will contain given that the event that caused the shortening 
did in fact occur. Even though these determinations are mere es-
timates (because we cannot predict the future), the aggregation 
mechanism provides the function to go from the values of the parts 
to the value of the whole (a temporal period of a life or a sub-part 
thereof). Armed with a metric for quantifying the value of the per-
son’s life in both possible states of affairs (the one in which the 
harm is incurred and the one in which no harm is incurred), we 
can then quantify how much happiness a person lost as a result of 
his having his life shortened.
Depending on one’s aggregation mechanism of choice, it might 
be the case that having one’s life shortened cannot be a harm, or 
that it can be. Further, if one’s aggregation mechanism gives one 
the result that a person can (in general) be harmed by having his 
life shortened, applying the aggregation mechanism to the facts of 
a particular case would enable us to make an estimate about 
whether there in fact was a harm to the person in the particular 
case due to his having his life shortened. Further, if there was a 
66. See generally Pressman, supra note 9.
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harm to the person, applying the aggregation mechanism to the 
facts of the case would also enable one to determine how much the 
person was harmed (in terms of happiness) by having his life 
shortened.
Thus, our determination of the aggregation mechanism will tell 
us whether—and, if so, how much (in terms of happiness)—a per-
son is harmed by having his life shortened.
Our, question, then, will be whether we should espouse TU-type 
aggregation, AU-type aggregation (and if so, which sub-version of 
AU-type aggregation, because it turns out that, based on one’s
choice of the relevant temporal “reference class,” AU-type aggrega-
tion can take a number of different forms), or some hybrid alter-
native aggregation type (or, further, some other type of aggrega-
tion mechanism altogether).67
As I have argued elsewhere, it turns out that unless we espouse 
what I will call the “lost years” temporal sub-version of AU-type ag-
gregation, we will think that a person can be harmed by having his 
life shortened. Thus, unless one espouses the lost years version of 
AU-type aggregation, one will think that there can be cases where 
there should be compensation for a person for his having his life 
shortened. This is an important finding, especially in light of the 
fact that the status quo of the law is that courts almost as a rule do 
not compensate people for having their lives shortened.68 Unless 
we espouse a particular theory (namely AU, and the version of AU 
that compares the lost years themselves), the status quo must 
change. We should compensate people for having their lives short-
ened.
As we see, the first step in exploring what the law should do 
about cases involving the shortening-of-life issues is to determine 
which aggregation mechanism to espouse. The second step is to 
determine how much happiness this aggregation mechanism says 
that a person lost. I have now touched on these steps. The third 
step, which I carry out elsewhere but touch on briefly below, is 
then to determine how much money will bring about a happiness 
transfer that will return to a person the amount of happiness that 
he lost.
67. The very few courts that have allowed recovery have used TU-type aggregation but 
have not grounded that application in any analysis. See supra, note 58, 59 and accompanying 
text.
68. See Pressman, supra note 9.
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2. Converting the Answer to the Happiness Questions into a 
Measure of Compensation for the Aggrieved Person
While espousing the version of AU that compares the lost years 
themselves would prescribe that there be no remedy for having 
one’s life shortened, the various other theories of happiness do not 
yield obvious prescriptions in terms of what the appropriate reme-
dy should be for a person whose life is shortened. Further inquiry 
and analysis are required to convert the assessments (be they abso-
lute or relative) of these other theories into remedy quantities to 
award to the person whose life was shortened.
Thus, carrying out this further inquiry and analysis is the next 
step: That is, the inquiry is into how to translate the information 
regarding (a) the facts in terms of happiness of a particular case, 
combined with the information about (b) the choice of aggrega-
tion mechanism and the choice of a temporal reference class (leav-
ing aside the lost years version of AU, for which we already know 
the answer to the inquiry), into (c) a determination of what reme-
dy (i.e., how much compensation) we should give to the person 
whose life has been shortened to bring them back to the level that 
they would have been at if not for the harm that they incurred.69
* * * *
In sum, the foregoing sketches the analysis required to be car-
ried out in order to answer the questions of (1) whether a person 
is harmed by having his life shortened, (2) if the person is harmed 
by having his life shortened, how much a person is harmed by hav-
ing his life shortened (in terms of happiness), and (3) if the per-
son is harmed by having his life shortened, how much he should 
be compensated in tort to bring him back to the level that he was 
at. The three steps to carry out in order to answer these questions 
involve (1) determining which aggregation mechanism is most 
plausible, (2) determining how much happiness, according to the 
aggregation mechanism of choice, has been lost by the person as a 
result of the lost years, and (3) determining how much of a money 
transfer to the plaintiff would bring the plaintiff’s to the level of 
happiness that it would have been at (according to the aggregation 
mechanism of choice) had the plaintiff not incurred the harm that 
he incurred.
69. Id.
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VI. EXTENSIONS
As we have seen, the conclusions of this Article carry both theo-
retical significance and matter concretely for a significant number 
of cases, including all those where remedy is sought for the short-
ening of a life. That set of cases is already substantial, since it in-
cludes, among others, cases of (1) malpractice, (2) torts of expo-
sure to dangerous substances, (3) torts involving accidents, and (4) 
intentional torts.
In this Part, I raise and address three important sets of exten-
sions to this Article’s conclusions. First, I show that technological 
advances are likely to expand significantly the set of cases where 
courts must confront shortening-of-life cases. Second, I show that 
courts must confront different-numbers problems (and thus 
choose an appropriate aggregation mechanism) even in some cas-
es where no shortening of life is involved. Third, I show that differ-
ent-numbers problems in the population-wide context are already 
confronted by the law and by society in a wide range of areas—
even if not by courts—and it is crucial to articulate a solution to 
different-numbers problems in this context as well. All three ex-
pansions will show that the problems addressed in this Article ex-
tend farther and wider than has been apparent so far.
A. Various Ways in Which the Development of Technology Is Likely to 
Increase the Prevalence of Situations that Confront the Topics of 
This Article (Regarding Different-Numbers Problems and the 
Shortening of a Person’s Life)
For various reasons, it seems as though the prevalence of cases 
of shortening of life (i.e., different-numbers problems) in the law 
is likely to be much greater in the future than it is now. This is 
primarily due to various ways in which technology might affect 
things. In particular, it seems that technology will provide us with 
greater and greater ability to be accurate and precise in our esti-
mates of how long a particular person will live.
1. Technology Is Likely to Bring About More Knowledge About 
Life Expectancies, and thus There Will Be More Cases Where One 
Can Know that One’s Life Has Been Shortened
With the current state of our technology, it is often very difficult 
to make good estimates of how long a person will live—be it either 
absent a life-shortening harm having been incurred or be it after 
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the occurrence of, and taking into account the existence of, a life-
shortening event. As I discussed in Part IV.D.2, this inability of ours 
to make good estimates of how long a person will live is, I think, 
perhaps one of the main reasons that the law has been able to 
avoid seriously considering the questions about remedies for 
shortened life that have been the subject of this Article. In most 
situations it seems all but impossible to make an estimate with any 
confidence about how long a person will live or about how a par-
ticular event in a person’s life will affect the length of his life. (Of 
course, as I’ve argued, while this may have contributed to the law’s
failure to consider these questions, the failure to consider these 
questions has still been a glaring omission, because even with our 
current technology there are cases where we are able to make es-
timates, and in many of these cases we are able to make estimates 
with high confidence about the number of years a life has been 
shortened by, because the facts are clear and stark.)
The various situations discussed in this Article have been cases 
where it seems that we are able, with greater confidence, to make 
estimates about how much an event shortens a person’s life: These 
estimates we have considered have generally been a result of the 
clear and stark contrast between (1) the general remaining life ex-
pectancy of a person given his current age and what the life expec-
tancy is of human beings, and (2) the drastically shorter remaining 
life expectancy that we have high confidence in our estimate of, be 
it due to an immediate death or due to confident assessment that a 
person will only have six months or a year to live as a result of hav-
ing a cancer that is advanced and the effects on life expectancy of 
which are well known.
If, however, our estimates were able to get more precise and ac-
curate, due to developments of technology, then it seems that the 
number of cases where we can know with confidence that an event 
causes an increase or decrease in life expectancy will grow, and 
along with this increase there will be an increase in the number of 
people seeking to be compensated for decreases in the length of 
their lives.
Further, there does seem to be reason to think that technology 
will enable us to have better and better estimates regarding how 
long a particular person will live. Our scientific and technological 
capacities grow every year and there is no reason to think that 
these developments will not yield a more exact science regarding 
life expectancy. Further, it might not only be that we will become 
better able to predict the effects on life expectancy of serious 
events such as traumatic injuries and failures to correctly diagnose 
diseases at an early stage, but we might even become able to pre-
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dict with accuracy and precision the effects on life expectancy of 
more and more seemingly trivial events (such as catching a cold or 
undergoing a stressful week at work) as our science and technology 
advances even further.
Additionally, not only might our scientific and technological de-
velopments enable us to make better estimates about life expec-
tancy, but so too might these developments enable us to better 
predict the levels of happiness that a person will experience in his 
future. While information about future happiness will not directly 
lead to more cases of different-numbers problems that the law will 
confront, it might do so indirectly. This is because, while perhaps 
with our current state of knowledge it might seem as though huge 
uncertainty and variance in our prediction of the future happiness 
level of a person might overwhelm and obscure any information we 
might have about a small difference in the expected length of 
one’s future, if we have more accurate and precise estimates of 
happiness levels in the future, this might change things. If we have 
more accurate and precise estimates of happiness levels in the fu-
ture, this might make it the case that a loss of a small amount of 
one’s length of life would still be clear enough in terms of how 
much of a happiness loss one would incur during the lost period of 
life that one might then be able to bring a suit that one otherwise 
would not if there were less information about one’s future happi-
ness levels. (If the disparity between the two states of affairs in 
terms of length of life lost were large, however, it seems that even 
imprecise estimates of future happiness levels would not prevent 
there from being fairly clear cases of losses to one’s expected fu-
ture happiness.)
In sum, it seems that developments in science in technology are 
likely to lead to much better estimates of how long a person will 
live, and this will likely make it the case that, in the future, more 
people will have claims about specific losses to their life expectan-
cy. In light of this, the questions raised in this Article will grow in 
importance going forward, and they will be brought to the fore-
front of both theoretical and practical legal discussions and de-
bates.
2. Inventions that Give Rise to the Need for 
Policy Decisions that Confront the Topics of this Article
There is an additional way in which technology might bring 
questions associated with different-numbers problems and the 
shortening of a person’s life to the forefront. Developments in sci-
ence and technology might give rise to inventions that force us to 
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make policy decisions reflecting a decision about which aggrega-
tion mechanism is most plausible.
Consider, for example self-driving cars. In deciding how to pro-
gram the cars to handle certain types of situations (such as an im-
pending accident that could be avoided but only by causing a dif-
ferent type of accident), decisions must be made about how we 
value quantity and quality of life. This type of weighing in these 
cases can be about weighing quantities of lives versus quality of lives
(in cases where different numbers of people could be killed or in-
jured by different actions taken by the self-driving car), but this 
type of weighing in these cases can also be about weighing quantity 
of moments in a single life versus the quality of moments in a sin-
gle life (if, say, weighing two different types of injuries to the same 
person).70 These latter cases of intrapersonal weighings are the 
types of different-numbers problems I have been addressing in this 
Article.
To the extent that developments in science and technology lead 
to the need for decisions of this sort, this is another way in which 
developments in science and technology can lead to the increased 
prevalence and importance of the questions at issue in this Article 
about which aggregation mechanism is the most plausible.
3. The Advent of Technology Increasing Lifespans Will 
Increase the Prevalence of Situations that Confront the 
Topics of this Article
There are also other examples of ways in which developments in 
science and technology might give rise to increased prevalence of 
the questions regarding different-numbers problems associated 
with different lengths of a person’s life that I discuss in this Article. 
One other such example is that there are starting to be discoveries 
about drugs that might increase people’s life span, and there is 
reason to think that these technologies will develop and that we 
might have the ability to greatly increase a person’s lifespan by hav-
ing them undergo a particular treatment.
If it does turn out that we will start to be able to greatly increase 
people’s life spans, there are various ways in which this might in-
crease the prevalence and importance of the questions regarding 
70. The European Union is establishing several fora for the research of just such ques-
tions. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions: On the Road to Automated 
Mobility: An EU Strategy for Mobility of the Future, at 17, COM (2018) 283 final (May 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/3rd-mobility-
pack/com20180283_en.pdf.
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different-numbers problems associated with different lengths of a 
person’s life. The following are among them.
(1) This technology would introduce an additional way in which 
a person’s life expectancy can be varied, thus introducing ways in 
which a person can be harmed by having his life expectancy short-
ened, (2) there would be greater possible amounts of life that 
could be lost, and thus people might pay more attention to the 
need for compensation for a person who has his life shortened, (3) 
different people might not have equal access to these treatments, 
and thus different lives might be of very different lengths, thus 
making it harder (i.e., a more flagrant mistake), for the purposes 
of private law remedies, to just treat all lives as being of the same 
length and to thus ignore length of life altogether (as we currently 
do).71 Lastly, perhaps more broadly and more generally, but also 
most importantly, (4) as we start to have more options for different 
lengths of lives, we will more frequently and in various ways and 
various contexts confront questions about how to value chunks of 
life for a person and how to trade off quantity of life versus quality 
of life for a person.
4. Summary
For the various reasons provided in this Section, there are strong 
reasons to think that developments in science and technology are 
likely to lead to growing importance, going forward, of the ques-
tions discussed in this Article regarding different-numbers prob-
lems and the shortening of a person’s life. As we move forward, it 
seems likely that these questions will become more and more prev-
alent in life, the legal system (including private law remedies), and 
in and for policy in general. In light of this, although it is already 
of great importance to address these difficult questions now—even 
leaving aside my discussion of the future—my hypotheses about 
how science and technology in the future will increase the preva-
lence and importance of these topics make it even more important 
that we address these questions head-on now. If we do so, we will 
then be armed with greater clarity on these issues for when their 
prevalence becomes even greater and more pervasive in the future.
71. Of course, as discussed in this Article, not only do we currently ignore lengths of 
lives and treat all lives as being of the same length, but, as a general rule, we also do not 
compensate people for having their lives shortened. The two topics mentioned here are is-
sues that are related but distinct.
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B. Situations Confronting the Choice Between Aggregation Mechanism 
that Do Not Fall into the Same Category as Those Addressed 
Throughout This Article (i.e., Situations that Do Not Involve the 
Shortening of a Person’s Life)
Recall that the point throughout this Article has been that it is 
cases of different-numbers problems—and not cases of same-
numbers problems—that give rise to the need to decide which ag-
gregation mechanism we find most plausible. In same-numbers 
problems, we don’t seem to have to choose which aggregation 
mechanism to employ, because all aggregation mechanisms have 
the same prescriptions. While these points are true, I think that 
there are some situations in which same-numbers cases might be-
have like different-numbers cases, and in these situations, it seems 
that we will have to choose which aggregation mechanism to em-
ploy. This might occur in a few types of situations, one of which is 
the following.
Suppose that there are two plaintiffs who are harmed by a de-
fendant, and that the harm incurred does not affect the life expec-
tancy of either plaintiff. Because life expectancies are not affected, 
we would seemingly have a same-numbers problem. Suppose, how-
ever, that the defendant does not have enough money to fully 
compensate both plaintiffs.72 Suppose further that in a case of this 
sort, where we cannot bring both plaintiffs one hundred-percent of 
the way back to the level that they were at, that what we want to do 
is to treat both plaintiffs equally. Treating the plaintiffs equally in a 
case like this, however, could be defined in different ways.
One way in which one might define bringing about equal treat-
ment in a case like this would be to use the available funds of the 
defendant to move the two plaintiffs an equal number of units of 
happiness in the direction of the level that they were at. If this were 
the principle that we employed, we would be forced to address the 
question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. For 
the purposes of the following, in order to focus in on the question 
I’m addressing, I will make the simplifying assumption that the 
plaintiffs have the same conversion rate between money and hap-
piness.
On the one hand, if we espoused TU, then we would provide the 
amounts of money to both plaintiffs that we think would provide 
them with the same number of sum-aggregative units of happiness 
72. And perhaps the defendant also does not even have enough money to compensate 
either one of the plaintiffs fully. Regardless of whether this is the case, though, what’s rele-
vant here is that the defendant does not have enough to compensate both of the plaintiffs 
fully.
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to add to the amount of happiness units that they will experience 
going forward. Because I’m assuming that the two plaintiffs have 
the same conversion rates between utility and money, they would 
then receive the same sums of money.
If, on the other hand, we espoused AU, the analysis about how 
much money to give to the two plaintiffs might be different than it 
was with TU. With AU, we would provide the amounts of money to 
the plaintiffs that we think would bring about an increase in the 
same number of units of happiness, as quantified by AU—i.e., an
increase in the average happiness for the person over the relevant 
period of time. Of course, what the relevant period of time is 
would be a function of which version of AU one espouses, and the 
relevant period might be one’s whole life, or one’s future. Regard-
less of which version of AU one espouses, more information re-
garding that chunk of time (for both plaintiffs) would be relevant 
for the determination of how to divide the defendant’s funds to 
bring about an equal gain in units of average happiness to the two 
plaintiffs. Again, we are assuming that the conversion rate of hap-
piness to money is the same for both plaintiffs, and, in light of this, 
we will not need to know what the happiness level (or financial 
wealth) is for the plaintiffs during the respective chunks of time 
(be it their futures or their whole lives). Their happiness level will 
not come into play. What will be relevant to know, however, is how 
long this chunk of time is for the two plaintiffs respectively. This is 
because if we are to bring about an increase in average happiness 
for a chunk of time for two people, and person one’s chunk of 
time is twice as long as person two’s chunk of time, it will take twice 
as many sum-aggregative units of happiness added to person one’s
chunk of time to increase his chunk of time by a certain number of 
units of average happiness as it would to increase person two’s
chunk of time by the same number of units of average happiness.
In light of this, for cases of the sort that I am considering, if we 
are trying to treat two plaintiffs equally by bringing them the same 
amount of an increase in happiness, we will confront the question 
of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible, and this is be-
cause different aggregation mechanisms will yield different pre-
scriptions about how to divide the defendant’s money. TU would 
suggest splitting it equally and ignoring information about lengths 
of any lives or the lengths of any parts of any lives, whereas a 
“whole-life” version of AU would determine how to divide the 
money based on what the expected life length will be of the two 
plaintiffs, whereas a “future” version of AU would determine how 
to divide the money based on what the expected length of the two 
plaintiffs’ futures will be. Thus, in the scenarios I’m considering, 
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and on the definition of “treating the plaintiffs equally” that I’ve 
been considering, we would be forced to determine which aggre-
gation mechanism we think is most plausible.
Now let’s consider another possible definition of “bringing 
about equal treatment” for the two plaintiffs—i.e., a definition 
other than providing them with equal amounts of happiness (how-
ever that phrase, in turn, gets defined). Another way in which one 
might think that we bring about equal treatment in the cases we 
are addressing would be to bring both plaintiffs an equal percentage
of the way back to the level that they were at, given the constraints 
of how much money the defendant has. While this type of a situa-
tion could arise in the context of a tort suit, this method of provid-
ing the same percentage of a plaintiff’s loss to the various plaintiffs 
(a loss which in some cases could be quantified financially, but 
which here we are quantifying in terms of loss to a plaintiff’s hap-
piness level) is akin to the way matters are handled in other areas 
of the law, including, among others, in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, 
there are often different creditors that have a claim of the same 
priority to the debtor’s assets, and when this is the case, the availa-
ble funds are distributed among the creditors so that they each re-
ceive the same percentage of the money they are owed by the 
debtor. Since these creditors are of the same priority level, we 
strive to bring each of them back the same percent of the way to 
the level that they were at before the debtor’s defaulted on the 
loans and filed for bankruptcy.73
If this were the way we defined treating the plaintiffs equally, we 
would not need to address the aggregation mechanism question. 
This is because the prescriptions for how to divide the defendant’s
money between the two plaintiffs would be the same regardless of 
which aggregation mechanism we thought was most plausible.74 On 
TU, both plaintiffs suffer a certain amount of a loss in sum-
aggregative units of happiness (be it directly through a tort that is a 
non-economic harm, or be indirectly through a tort that is an eco-
nomic harm), and then they will be returned (via a monetary sum) 
an equal percent of the loss in sum-aggregative units of happiness. 
On AU, even though the loss in AU is calculated in part by looking 
at how long the relevant chunk of time is for the person (be it his 
whole lifetime or his future), it is also a function of how many sum-
aggregative units of happiness we think that the person, as a result 
of the harm, has lost for that time chunk. Thus, regardless of which 
73. See generally, David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 699, 700 (2018).
74. Recall again that I’m assuming that both plaintiffs have the same conversion rate 
between money and happiness.
SPRING 2020] Calculating Compensation 665
time period we say is relevant and regardless of how long these re-
spective time periods are for the two people, the loss in AU units 
for both people will be proportional to the loss of sum-aggregative 
happiness units that they incur for that time period. Thus, the way 
to return the two plaintiffs an equal proportion of their losses in 
happiness according to either version of the AU theory will, just as 
with TU, require a return of a number of sum-aggregative happi-
ness units to one plaintiff that is the same percentage of his total 
loss of sum-aggregative happiness units as is the other plaintiff’s
percentage recovery of his total loss of sum-aggregative happiness 
units.
Hence, if we are employing an “equal percentage of loss” recov-
ery theory of equal treatment of the plaintiffs, we need not address 
the happiness aggregation mechanism question, because the pre-
scriptions of all the different aggregation mechanisms come out as 
being the same.
In sum, if one adopts the theory of equal treatment of plaintiffs 
that involves giving each plaintiff the same amount of happiness 
back, then, in the scenarios I’m considering, we will confront the 
question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. If, 
however, we instead adopt the “equal percentage of loss” recovery 
theory of equal treatment, then we will not confront the question 
of which aggregation mechanism to espouse. These two definitions 
of equal treatment of plaintiffs might not be the only possible def-
initions in these scenarios that I’m considering, however. As for 
whether other definitions would require us to confront the aggre-
gation mechanism question, it seems to me that additional ac-
counts of how to treat the plaintiffs equally are likely to behave like 
the “equal amount of happiness” theory and unlike the “equal per-
centage of loss” recovery theory. It seems to me that the “equal 
percentage of loss” recovery theory is likely the only option that 
would enable us to avoid the aggregation mechanism question in 
scenarios like the ones I’m considering.
Thus, to the extent that one espouses a theory of equal treat-
ment of plaintiffs that is not the “equal percentage of loss” recovery 
theory, then the situations discussed here are examples of situa-
tions in the law that are not different-numbers problems, but which 
still confront the question of which aggregation mechanism is the 
most plausible.75 This is significant, because up until here, I have 
75. While this is one way to classify these cases, it seems that a more accurate way to 
classify these cases would be to say that they indeed are different-numbers problems, but 
these different-numbers problems—unlike those I’ve discussed throughout the Article—do 
not involve two states of affairs for the same person where one state of affairs for the person 
is shorter due the person’s life having been shortened by some event. Here, we do have a 
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only identified different-numbers problems as the types of situa-
tions where we confront the question of which aggregation mech-
anism is most plausible. The context discussed here in this exten-
sion Section thus expands the relevance of the discussions and 
conclusions in this Article.76
C. Extensions Regarding Different-Numbers Problems in the 
Population-Wide Context
This Article has addressed the ways in which the law confronts 
different-numbers problems. In so doing, the Article has focused 
almost exclusively on the ways in which private law remedies con-
front different-numbers problems when tasked with valuing lives of 
different lengths. It’s important to briefly note here, though, that 
that there are also other ways in which the law does and will con-
front different-numbers problems.
Recall that different-numbers problems arise whenever we are 
comparing the values of two wholes, where the two wholes are 
composed of different numbers of parts, and where the values of 
the wholes are a function of the values of their parts. While one 
context in which this occurs is in comparing lives of different 
lengths (which thus are composed of a different number of parts 
(i.e., a different number of moments)), another context in which 
this occurs is in comparing populations of different sizes (which 
thus are composed of a different number of parts (i.e., a different 
number of lives)). In the population-wide context, we again must 
choose which aggregation mechanism (be it AU, TU, or some oth-
er option) is most plausible for assessing the value of the whole, 
given the values of its parts. Again, the task of choosing which ag-
gregation mechanism is most plausible is an extremely tricky one, 
where all possible accounts confront seemingly devastatingly coun-
terintuitive implications. The umbrella name for these questions in 
the population-wide context is population ethics. While I will not 
delve deeply into the topic here, I will briefly mention various ways 
in which the law—and, more generally, society—confronts ques-
tions in population ethics (and thus ways in which the law con-
different-numbers problem, but the comparison is between two chunks of time of different 
lengths, one of which belongs to one person and the other which belongs to a different per-
son—but with both chunks of time that are compared being in the same state of affairs (i.e.,
in the same world, be it an actual or a merely possible world).
76. These comments still apply with the same force even if the appropriate terminology 
is different, as discussed in the previous footnote. While the comments would apply with the 
same force, the appropriate terminology would of course need to be substituted in for the 
terminology I currently use.
SPRING 2020] Calculating Compensation 667
fronts different-numbers problems in a context other than the pri-
vate law remedies context that has been the focus of this Article).
One example of a way in which society will confront different-
numbers problems in a population-wide context arises in a context 
already discussed above: the context of self-driving cars. As I dis-
cussed, the programming of self-driving cars forces us to answer 
questions about how to compare lives of different lengths. That 
context, however, also requires us to answer questions about how 
to compare populations of different sizes—i.e., how to trade off 
deaths of a different number of people that would occur in differ-
ent states of affairs. (For example, a programmer might have to 
decide how to trade off the death of one passenger against the 
deaths of three pedestrians.) Thus, technologies like self-driving 
cars not only require us to confront different-numbers problems in 
the context of comparing lives of different lengths (thus forcing 
us, at least implicitly, to value the existence of more or fewer years 
of life), but also different-numbers problems in the context of 
populations of different sizes (thus forcing us, at least implicitly, to 
value the existence of more or fewer lives).
While self-driving cars are one small example, policy topics con-
fronting different-numbers problems in population ethics abound. 
Among the various areas that confront these questions are: where
to put our medical and scientific research dollars (e.g., toward 
technologies and practices associated with saving lives of fetuses 
and infants, toward other life-saving technologies for adults, or 
perhaps, on the other hand, toward quality-of-life-enhancing tech-
nologies such as things like hip replacements); whether we should 
have laws or, more mildly, perhaps tax-incentives, that promote 
larger or smaller families; and, perhaps, questions about to what 
extent various resources should be conserved (assuming some type 
of relationship between resources and a population’s size and be-
tween resources and a population’s happiness).
These are just a few examples. Different-numbers problems in a 
population-wide context already are confronted by the law and by 
society in a huge range of areas, and it is crucial for us to articulate 
a plausible solution to different-numbers problems in the popula-
tion-wide context as well.
D. Summary Regarding Extensions
Even without the considerations raised and discussed in the 
foregoing extension Sections, the discussions and conclusions of 
the Article pertain to a substantial number of cases that are not 
relegated to the mere periphery of the law. As we can now see, 
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however, the implications and effects of the Article’s discussions
are even more wide-ranging than we might have thought. This is 
both because (1) the types of situations addressed in the Article 
are likely to grow in prevalence and importance in the future as 
technology develops, and (2) because there are a variety of other 
ways—even here and now, in the present—in which the law con-
fronts different-numbers problems, and these additional ways in 
which the law confronts different-numbers problems had not yet 
been discussed in the Article.
CONCLUSION
The contributions of this Article have been both theoretical and 
practical. The theoretical: The discussions and conclusions of this 
Article provide analysis and insight in areas where there have been 
gaps in legal theory. This is the case for all of the discussions of the 
Article, but, perhaps most notably, the discussions regarding (1) 
precisifying and better understanding the notion of “the level that 
a person is (or was) at,” (2) different-numbers problems and their 
application to legal topics, (3) whether a person is harmed by hav-
ing his death be sooner than it otherwise would be, and (4) wheth-
er a person should be compensated for having his life shortened, 
to name just a few of the topics addressed. These gaps in legal the-
ory (as well as other gaps in legal theory that the Article addressed) 
exist and have existed, despite being gaps that have resulted in 
vagueness, imprecision, and under-description in notions and 
terms that are ubiquitous in the law. Noticing that these gaps exist 
and showing them to the reader is the key first step that this Article 
carries out. Second, the Article attempts to provide answers to 
many of the questions, and to at least lay the foundations for an-
swers to others. The analysis here thus constitutes theoretical pro-
gress toward articulating a more precise and exhaustive theory un-
derlying our legal principles. This is the theoretical contribution.
The Article’s theoretical contribution also results in important 
practical contributions. Most important are the practical implica-
tions associated with potential compensation for a person who has 
his life shortened. As is, the law does not provide compensation to 
a person for his having his life shortened. This position is in great 
tension with commonsense intuitions according to which little if 
anything is a more serious harm than having one’s life shortened. 
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If it turns out that our commonsense intuitions are correct, then 
there is an egregious gap in the law that needs to be filled. This Ar-
ticle helps lay the foundation for the inquiry into the questions of 
whether a person is harmed by having his life shortened, and if so, 
how great this harm is. Depending on what our answers are to 
these questions, the current state of the law might need to undergo 
significant changes. These changes would affect private law reme-
dies and affect the lives of very many people. Furthermore, it seems 
very likely that our answers will dictate the result that changes do
need to be made. Further still, these practical effects of the discus-
sions in this Article (and of the discussions that it lays the founda-
tion for) will likely grow in importance and prevalence as technol-
ogy develops in the coming years. We must not lose time both (1) 
in determining whether a change should be made, and, if so, (2) 
in bringing about this change.
Lastly, the goals of this Article can also be described at a higher 
level of generality: These goals are to bring about a legal system 
that better furthers both fairness and efficiency. As for fairness: to 
the extent that the law can have remedies that more accurately 
(and precisely) track the harms that are incurred, this will mini-
mize instances of over- and under-compensation and thus bring 
about greater fairness. As for efficiency: the more accurately (and 
precisely) that remedies track the harms that are incurred, the 
more that those two things will happen, both of which will result in 
greater efficiency: (1) to the extent that remedies begin to more 
accurately track harms in situations where the remedies had been 
either non-existent or too small to fully compensate a party, the 
more accurate tracking of remedies to harms will force parties to 
internalize the externalities they would otherwise impose, and this 
will lead to greater efficiency. Additionally, and conversely, (2) to 
the extent that remedies begin to more accurately track harms in 
situations where the remedies had been too large (either for an ac-
tivity that currently is mistakenly thought to cause harm to others 
or that is correctly thought to cause harm to others but where the 
amount of this harm is overestimated), the more accurate tracking 
of remedies to harms will enable parties to avoid liability (or the 
threat of liability), the latter of which could have a distortionary ef-
fect on behavior, thus causing non-optimally-efficient behavior.
My hope is that the considerations in this Article and the chang-
es to the law that they set in motion can make progress with re-
spect to both fairness and efficiency.

